States of affairs only require an explanation if we have some contrary expectation, some reason to be surprised that they hold.
That claim is just an unsupported assertion.
Also, I take issue with the concept of a state of affairs requiring an explanation. Certainly this requirement is not a property of the state of affairs, it is rather a property of a mind that is considering the state of affairs. But what does it mean even then? That a mind with this requirement refuses to beleive the state of affairs without the explanation? That a mind that does believe the state affairs but lacks an explanination will compulsively search for an explanation? Well, fine, you can reject requiring an explanation under that sort of definition, and still be interested in an explanation.
We have no prior reason to expect that “nothing” would be a viable alternative to “something.” Trying to explain “why existence” is pointless; existence is, inherently. Explaining how existence works is the useful and meaningful goal.
There must be some true descriptions of a reality, i.e. actualized rules or meta-rules or meta-...rules, because just as “there are no applicable rules” is a meta-rule, “there are no rules or meta-rules or meta-meta-rules or meta-...rules” would be a meta-(meta-[meta-{meta-...}])rule.
So by counterfactually assuming no low-level rules while being indifferent to the number of (meta-[meta-{meta-...}])rules, we arrived at an infinity of (meta-[meta-{meta-...}])rules, one per level of meta after the lowest/first level: “There are no actualized rules, there is only one meta-rule, there is only one meta-meta-rule...there is only one (meta-[meta-{meta-...}])rule”.
If there were any other lowest/first level rule, it would be possible to make a different meta-rule describing the lower rule and thereby form the base of what could only be a different infinite meta-tower than that described above as the result of not having low-level rules. In any case, that would be at least one base-level rule.
Therefore, the question “Why are there some true actualized (meta-[meta-{meta-...}])rules?” is ill-formed because it logically could not be otherwise.
Finally, if the question “why is there X rather than not X?” is ill-formed because the counterfactual of assuming (not X) led to a contradiction, then not (not X) i.e. X. So: not “why is it the case that there are at least some (meta-[meta-{meta-...}])rules rather than none?”, rather, “there are at least some (meta-[meta-{meta-...}])rules.”
Yes, that is what I’m saying. “Nothing” means no space, no time, no energy, no particles, no fields, no interactions… not even any “meta-rules,” as you put it. Existence is fundamentally the context of everything, regardless of at how many levels we can describe it, or how many forms the rules could or do take. When we discuss phenomena within the context, it can make sense to say “why is there X rather than not X (or Y, or Z...)”, but it doesn’t make sense to discuss the context itself in that way.
it doesn’t make sense to discuss the context itself in that way.
As I think of it, it does make sense to talk about the wider context of the rules, which are the meta-rules, but it does not make sense to demand a context that cannot itself be described within a wider context.
(If a (meta-[meta-{meta-...}])ruleset had a horizontal slice of the meta-tower identical to the other immediately higher and lower slices, then it would provide its own context. Somehow the rules and meta-rules would have to be identical, but it would still have a context, it just wouldn’t be a different context. I’m not sure this is possible, but that “possible” world isn’t ours anyway. If it were, the rules would be the meta-rules too, and we wouldn’t have to look deeper.
I strongly doubt the tower can repeat, e.g. with rules identical to meta-meta-rules, unless they are also equal to the meta-rules and every other level.
The “tower” with rules on the bottom, meta-rules above that, etc. is either repeating or non-repeating, but I don’t see how it could have a limited number of floors.)
Regardless, if the rules/first floor is empty (i.e. there are no rules by which anything exists) then the meta-rules/second floor has an occupant (i.e. “there are no rules by which anything exists”) so the meta-tower isn’t empty.
We have no prior reason to expect that “nothing” would be a viable alternative to “something.”
I absolutely agree with this. To establish that “non-existence” is exclusively opposed to “existence” requires a careful analysis of the nature of existence.
Can anybody point to work along these lines? I am actively researching the topic.
Trying to explain “why existence” is pointless; existence is, inherently.
I’m not sure how you mean this. By “why existence”, do you mean something like the “purpose of existence”?
Explaining how existence works is the useful and meaningful goal.
I agree. I think that this topic ties directly to epistemology; explaining the nature of existence will help to explain the nature of knowledge.
I’m not sure how you mean this. By “why existence”, do you mean something like the “purpose of existence”?
I mean in the sense “why does existence exist?”. It’s really an inappropriate question, despite our ability to phrase it in what seems like a grammatically/linguistically correct way.
Then I agree that this question is probably poorly formed. Certainly it isn’t obvious to me that it is a meaningful or useful question.
I’m not sure why we have been down-voted for these comments. I suspect that it is because questioning existence in this way appears to challenge the “objective existence” aspects of scientific realism. (Down-voters please comment if I’m wrong.)
I’m not sure why we have been down-voted for these comments. I suspect that it is because questioning existence in this way appears to challenge the “objective existence” aspects of scientific realism. (Down-voters please comment if I’m wrong.)
I have had a fair amount of downvoting on this topic, with very little explanation. It’s somewhat frustrating.
First, the point made about no time existing prior to the Big Bang applies just as readily to the Standard Model as it does to Hawking’s newer model (which fudges math to create imaginary time and a “no boundary” version of the beginning). This new version accomplished nothing (no pun intended), because under any model it is nonsense to ask “What existed before time?” (because “before” is a temporal term, obviously). However, the question of WHY is there a universe at all? (i.e. what is the REASON?) is a perfectly fair question that should not be avoided (and is not temporally-based).
You said, “We have no prior reason to expect that ‘nothing’ would be a viable alternative to ‘something.’” Of course we do! Our experience ONE-HUNDRED PERCENT of the time contradicts this statement.
You said, “Trying to explain ‘why existence’ is pointless; existence is, inherently.” You’re committing the taxicab fallacy. You can’t just dismiss the causal principle at the point you’re “ready to get out.” If anything in your daily life happened out of the ordinary (like your car changed colors or someone threw a rock through your window), you would look for a sufficient REASON (because there IS one).
Finally, you said, “Explaining how existence works is the useful and meaningful goal.” Um, this is useful and meaningful (I agree), but we are only able to accomplish this using a little thing called the “Law of Causality.” So you’re willing to use the causal principle for EVERYTHING all the way back to the beginning, but then you choose to stick your head in the sand?
In Aristotle’s Metaphysics, he suggested the need for an “unmoved mover” to explain the motion of ordinary objects. That makes sense in the context of Aristotle’s physics, which was fundamentally teleological: objects tended toward their natural place, which is where they wanted to stay. How, then, to account for all the motion we find everywhere around us? But subsequent developments in physics – conservation of momentum, Newton’s laws of motion – changed the context in which such a question might be asked. Now we know that objects that are moving freely continue to move along a uniform trajectory, without anything moving them. Why? Because that’s what objects do. It’s often convenient, in the context of everyday life, for us to refer to this or that event as having some particular cause. But this is just shorthand for what’s really going on, namely: things are obeying the laws of physics.
Likewise for the universe. There is no reason, within anything we currently understand about the ultimate structure of reality, to think of the existence and persistence and regularity of the universe as things that require external explanation. Indeed, for most scientists, adding on another layer of metaphysical structure in order to purportedly explain these nomological facts is an unnecessary complication.
However fundamental you think the “causal principle” may be, modern physics is not done that way.
You’re making statements about events or phenomena that happen within the universe, and then taking a gigantic, unfounded leap to apply the same principles to the universe itself. How could we possibly have a prior reason to expect the absence of all existence? Not the existence of some specific thing, but existence, in the broadest sense.
That claim is just an unsupported assertion.
Also, I take issue with the concept of a state of affairs requiring an explanation. Certainly this requirement is not a property of the state of affairs, it is rather a property of a mind that is considering the state of affairs. But what does it mean even then? That a mind with this requirement refuses to beleive the state of affairs without the explanation? That a mind that does believe the state affairs but lacks an explanination will compulsively search for an explanation? Well, fine, you can reject requiring an explanation under that sort of definition, and still be interested in an explanation.
We have no prior reason to expect that “nothing” would be a viable alternative to “something.” Trying to explain “why existence” is pointless; existence is, inherently. Explaining how existence works is the useful and meaningful goal.
Are you saying something like the following?
There must be some true descriptions of a reality, i.e. actualized rules or meta-rules or meta-...rules, because just as “there are no applicable rules” is a meta-rule, “there are no rules or meta-rules or meta-meta-rules or meta-...rules” would be a meta-(meta-[meta-{meta-...}])rule.
So by counterfactually assuming no low-level rules while being indifferent to the number of (meta-[meta-{meta-...}])rules, we arrived at an infinity of (meta-[meta-{meta-...}])rules, one per level of meta after the lowest/first level: “There are no actualized rules, there is only one meta-rule, there is only one meta-meta-rule...there is only one (meta-[meta-{meta-...}])rule”.
If there were any other lowest/first level rule, it would be possible to make a different meta-rule describing the lower rule and thereby form the base of what could only be a different infinite meta-tower than that described above as the result of not having low-level rules. In any case, that would be at least one base-level rule.
Therefore, the question “Why are there some true actualized (meta-[meta-{meta-...}])rules?” is ill-formed because it logically could not be otherwise.
Finally, if the question “why is there X rather than not X?” is ill-formed because the counterfactual of assuming (not X) led to a contradiction, then not (not X) i.e. X. So: not “why is it the case that there are at least some (meta-[meta-{meta-...}])rules rather than none?”, rather, “there are at least some (meta-[meta-{meta-...}])rules.”
Yes, that is what I’m saying. “Nothing” means no space, no time, no energy, no particles, no fields, no interactions… not even any “meta-rules,” as you put it. Existence is fundamentally the context of everything, regardless of at how many levels we can describe it, or how many forms the rules could or do take. When we discuss phenomena within the context, it can make sense to say “why is there X rather than not X (or Y, or Z...)”, but it doesn’t make sense to discuss the context itself in that way.
As I think of it, it does make sense to talk about the wider context of the rules, which are the meta-rules, but it does not make sense to demand a context that cannot itself be described within a wider context.
(If a (meta-[meta-{meta-...}])ruleset had a horizontal slice of the meta-tower identical to the other immediately higher and lower slices, then it would provide its own context. Somehow the rules and meta-rules would have to be identical, but it would still have a context, it just wouldn’t be a different context. I’m not sure this is possible, but that “possible” world isn’t ours anyway. If it were, the rules would be the meta-rules too, and we wouldn’t have to look deeper.
I strongly doubt the tower can repeat, e.g. with rules identical to meta-meta-rules, unless they are also equal to the meta-rules and every other level.
The “tower” with rules on the bottom, meta-rules above that, etc. is either repeating or non-repeating, but I don’t see how it could have a limited number of floors.)
Regardless, if the rules/first floor is empty (i.e. there are no rules by which anything exists) then the meta-rules/second floor has an occupant (i.e. “there are no rules by which anything exists”) so the meta-tower isn’t empty.
I absolutely agree with this. To establish that “non-existence” is exclusively opposed to “existence” requires a careful analysis of the nature of existence.
Can anybody point to work along these lines? I am actively researching the topic.
I’m not sure how you mean this. By “why existence”, do you mean something like the “purpose of existence”?
I agree. I think that this topic ties directly to epistemology; explaining the nature of existence will help to explain the nature of knowledge.
I mean in the sense “why does existence exist?”. It’s really an inappropriate question, despite our ability to phrase it in what seems like a grammatically/linguistically correct way.
Then I agree that this question is probably poorly formed. Certainly it isn’t obvious to me that it is a meaningful or useful question.
I’m not sure why we have been down-voted for these comments. I suspect that it is because questioning existence in this way appears to challenge the “objective existence” aspects of scientific realism. (Down-voters please comment if I’m wrong.)
I have had a fair amount of downvoting on this topic, with very little explanation. It’s somewhat frustrating.
Same here.
sigh this is an unfortunate reply
First, the point made about no time existing prior to the Big Bang applies just as readily to the Standard Model as it does to Hawking’s newer model (which fudges math to create imaginary time and a “no boundary” version of the beginning). This new version accomplished nothing (no pun intended), because under any model it is nonsense to ask “What existed before time?” (because “before” is a temporal term, obviously). However, the question of WHY is there a universe at all? (i.e. what is the REASON?) is a perfectly fair question that should not be avoided (and is not temporally-based).
You said, “We have no prior reason to expect that ‘nothing’ would be a viable alternative to ‘something.’” Of course we do! Our experience ONE-HUNDRED PERCENT of the time contradicts this statement.
You said, “Trying to explain ‘why existence’ is pointless; existence is, inherently.” You’re committing the taxicab fallacy. You can’t just dismiss the causal principle at the point you’re “ready to get out.” If anything in your daily life happened out of the ordinary (like your car changed colors or someone threw a rock through your window), you would look for a sufficient REASON (because there IS one).
Finally, you said, “Explaining how existence works is the useful and meaningful goal.” Um, this is useful and meaningful (I agree), but we are only able to accomplish this using a little thing called the “Law of Causality.” So you’re willing to use the causal principle for EVERYTHING all the way back to the beginning, but then you choose to stick your head in the sand?
Once again...unfortunate.
Did you actually read the essay?
However fundamental you think the “causal principle” may be, modern physics is not done that way.
You’re making statements about events or phenomena that happen within the universe, and then taking a gigantic, unfounded leap to apply the same principles to the universe itself. How could we possibly have a prior reason to expect the absence of all existence? Not the existence of some specific thing, but existence, in the broadest sense.