I’ve noticed that one could read the argument and say: “Ok, an agent evaluates a parameter U differently at different times. Thus, a bookmaker exploits the agent with a bet/certificate whose value depends on U. What’s special about this?”
Of course the answer lies in the difference between cdt(a) and edt(a), specifically you wrote:
The key point here is that because the agent is betting ahead of time, it will evaluate the value of this bet according to the conditional expectation E(U|Act=a).
and
Now, since the agent is reasoning during its action, it is evaluating possible actions according to cdt(a); so its evaluation of the bet will be different.
I think developing this two points would be useful to readers since, usually, the pivotal concepts behind EDT and CDT are considered to be “conditional probabilities” and “(physical) causation” respectively, while here you seem to point at something different about the times at which decisions are made.
***
Unrelated to what I just wrote:
XXX insert the little bit about free will and stuff that I want to remove from the main argument… no reason to spend time justifying it there if I have a whole section for it here
I guess here you wanted to say something interesting about free will, but it was probably lost from the draft to the final version of the post.
I guess here you wanted to say something interesting about free will, but it was probably lost from the draft to the final version of the post.
Ah whoops. Fixed.
I think developing this two points would be useful to readers since, usually, the pivotal concepts behind EDT and CDT are considered to be “conditional probabilities” and “(physical) causation” respectively, while here you seem to point at something different about the times at which decisions are made.
I’m not sure what you mean here. The “two different times” are (1) just before CDT makes the decision, and (2) right when CDT makes the decision. So the two times aren’t about differentiating CDT and EDT.
The part that I don’t get is the reason why the agent is betting ahead of time implies evaluation according to edt, while the agent is reasoning during its action implies evaluation according to cdt. Sorry if I’m missing something trivial, but I’d like to receive an explanation because this seems a fundamental part of the argument.
Oh right, OK. That’s because of the general assumption that rational agents bet according to their beliefs. If a CDT agent doesn’t think of a bet as intervening on a situation, then when betting ahead of time, it’ll just bet according to its probabilities. But during the decision, it is using the modified (interventional) probabilities. That’s how CDT makes decisions. So any bets which have to be made simultaneously, as part of the decision, will be evaluated according to those modified beliefs.
This is an old post, but my idea of CDT is that it’s a rule for making decisions, not for setting beliefs. Thus the agent never believes in the outcome given by CDT, just that it should choose according to the payoffs it calculates. This is a seemingly weird way to do things, but apart from that is there a reason I should think about CDT as a prescription for forming beliefs while I am acting?
My confusion was: even “when the agent is acting”, I think it would still be appropriate to describe its beliefs according to EDT. However, I was confused by thinking about ”...and then offering a bet”. As far as I can tell, this is just an unnecessary bit of storytelling set around a two step decision problem, and a CDT agent has to evaluate the prospects of each decision according to CDT.
I’ve noticed that one could read the argument and say: “Ok, an agent evaluates a parameter U differently at different times. Thus, a bookmaker exploits the agent with a bet/certificate whose value depends on U. What’s special about this?”
Of course the answer lies in the difference between cdt(a) and edt(a), specifically you wrote:
and
I think developing this two points would be useful to readers since, usually, the pivotal concepts behind EDT and CDT are considered to be “conditional probabilities” and “(physical) causation” respectively, while here you seem to point at something different about the times at which decisions are made.
***
Unrelated to what I just wrote:
I guess here you wanted to say something interesting about free will, but it was probably lost from the draft to the final version of the post.
Ah whoops. Fixed.
I’m not sure what you mean here. The “two different times” are (1) just before CDT makes the decision, and (2) right when CDT makes the decision. So the two times aren’t about differentiating CDT and EDT.
The part that I don’t get is the reason why the agent is betting ahead of time implies evaluation according to edt, while the agent is reasoning during its action implies evaluation according to cdt. Sorry if I’m missing something trivial, but I’d like to receive an explanation because this seems a fundamental part of the argument.
Oh right, OK. That’s because of the general assumption that rational agents bet according to their beliefs. If a CDT agent doesn’t think of a bet as intervening on a situation, then when betting ahead of time, it’ll just bet according to its probabilities. But during the decision, it is using the modified (interventional) probabilities. That’s how CDT makes decisions. So any bets which have to be made simultaneously, as part of the decision, will be evaluated according to those modified beliefs.
This is an old post, but my idea of CDT is that it’s a rule for making decisions, not for setting beliefs. Thus the agent never believes in the outcome given by CDT, just that it should choose according to the payoffs it calculates. This is a seemingly weird way to do things, but apart from that is there a reason I should think about CDT as a prescription for forming beliefs while I am acting?
My confusion was: even “when the agent is acting”, I think it would still be appropriate to describe its beliefs according to EDT. However, I was confused by thinking about ”...and then offering a bet”. As far as I can tell, this is just an unnecessary bit of storytelling set around a two step decision problem, and a CDT agent has to evaluate the prospects of each decision according to CDT.