It’s notable that, for countries where anti-social punishment is significant, the mean contribution across rounds doesn’t depend much on the level of anti-social punishment but more on the contributions in the first round; for the 7 countries with the most total anti-social punishment, their lines are all fairly flat.
Mean contribution and antisocial punishment (eyeballed from fig 2B in the report) aren’t correlated within the group of 7 (R2=0.08).
Mean contribution and initial contribution (eyeballed from fig 2A) are correlated within the group at R2=0.99!
So in countries with low rule of law you are stuck in whatever position you start in. Pity poor Istanbul which wasn’t really that bad at anti-social punishment but started at a low level and so were stuck there.
Imagine the experimenters had lied to each participant about what happened in round 1 to make it seem like everyone else was contributing more. Would the players stay at the high (made-up) rate of contributions for the rest of the 9 rounds?
It’s notable that, for countries where anti-social punishment is significant, the mean contribution across rounds doesn’t depend much on the level of anti-social punishment but more on the contributions in the first round; for the 7 countries with the most total anti-social punishment, their lines are all fairly flat.
Mean contribution and antisocial punishment (eyeballed from fig 2B in the report) aren’t correlated within the group of 7 (R2=0.08).
Mean contribution and initial contribution (eyeballed from fig 2A) are correlated within the group at R2=0.99!
So in countries with low rule of law you are stuck in whatever position you start in. Pity poor Istanbul which wasn’t really that bad at anti-social punishment but started at a low level and so were stuck there.
Imagine the experimenters had lied to each participant about what happened in round 1 to make it seem like everyone else was contributing more. Would the players stay at the high (made-up) rate of contributions for the rest of the 9 rounds?