But the ‘can never’ criterion is clearly false of some of the ‘interpretations’ we’re talking about, and only contingently and ambiguously true of any of them.
Interpretations are designed to give the same predictions as can be inferred from a no-interpretation math, otherwise they would be called theories.
What are you building into ‘right’/‘wrong’ here?
Experimentally testable new predictions. No more, no less.
Interpretations are designed to give the same predictions as can be inferred from a no-interpretation math, otherwise they would be called theories.
This is empirically false, as a statement about how scientific discourse works. Compare string theory, which is frequently labeled a ‘theory’ (or family of theories) even though it has far more difficult-to-observe posits (one-dimensional strings!) than most (perhaps all) of the mainstream QM ‘interpretations’. See also falsified QM interpretations.
Perhaps a more model-theoretic approach would be appropriate here; clearly QM interpretations can vary quite a bit in their verifiability/falsifiability, so what distinguishes them from other theories may be that they specify the meanings of the terms in the QM formalism. On this view, ‘interpretations’ may add real content and predictions to a set of statements, provided that in the process they also fix the semantics of a large portion of the statements. After all, the problem with QM is not merely that we aren’t clear on the invisible metaphysics secretly underwriting and accounting for our experiences; we aren’t even clear on the phenomenology (appearances) or ontology (observable posits) of the theory, treated as mere formalism.
Interpretations are designed to give the same predictions as can be inferred from a no-interpretation math, otherwise they would be called theories.
This isn’t necessarily true. Consider that the GRW interpretation has been pretty much falsified by Van Harlingen’s work at UIUC (macroscopic current superposition in SQUIDs). Most of the interpretations rely on different postulates than traditional Copenhagen quantum so there can be (and generally are) differences. However, to date, most of those differences aren’t measurable.
Similarly, we call many-worlds an “interpretation” even though no one has figured out how to actually make predictions with it. The difference between “interpretation” and “theory” is a bit loose.
This isn’t necessarily true. Consider that the GRW interpretation has been pretty much falsified by Van Harlingen’s work at UIUC (macroscopic current superposition in SQUIDs).
I am not familiar with the GRW theory, but, like most other objective collapse models and unlike [the lowest common denominator] Copenhagen, it appears to be more than an interpretation, so no wonder that it can be falsified.
Anyway, my definition of an interpretation is “same math, same predictions, different invisible underlying ontology”. If your definition is different, feel free to state it.
Almost all “interpretations” (using the word as used in the literature) of quantum mechanics use different axioms, and its a mathematical question as to whether or not the theories make the same predictions. Many stochastic “interpretations” modify the Schroedinger equation, for instance. Even many-worlds can’t be proven as an interpretation using your definition (no one has shown it actually leads to the same predictions as Copenhagen).
Its an unfortunate artifact of the literature on various approaches quantum mechanics that the words interpretation and theory often over-load each other, but its the reality we live in.
If that’s your definition, then it’s an empirical question whether a given model is an interpretation, because it’s often contingent and difficult-to-demonstrate that a given ontology is necessarily ‘invisible’, as opposed to ‘potentially-testable-but-as-yet-untested’. Impossibility proofs about future scientific experiments are no easy task. So we can only speculate about whether Many Worlds, Bohmian Mechanics, Collapse theories, etc. are ‘interpretations’ in your sense.
(And by ‘invisible’ I gather you mean ‘empirically equivalent to a certain set of rivals’—so whether something’s an interpretation is always relative to other models, the real predicate is interpretation-compared-to-x.)
Interpretations are designed to give the same predictions as can be inferred from a no-interpretation math, otherwise they would be called theories.
Experimentally testable new predictions. No more, no less.
This is empirically false, as a statement about how scientific discourse works. Compare string theory, which is frequently labeled a ‘theory’ (or family of theories) even though it has far more difficult-to-observe posits (one-dimensional strings!) than most (perhaps all) of the mainstream QM ‘interpretations’. See also falsified QM interpretations.
Perhaps a more model-theoretic approach would be appropriate here; clearly QM interpretations can vary quite a bit in their verifiability/falsifiability, so what distinguishes them from other theories may be that they specify the meanings of the terms in the QM formalism. On this view, ‘interpretations’ may add real content and predictions to a set of statements, provided that in the process they also fix the semantics of a large portion of the statements. After all, the problem with QM is not merely that we aren’t clear on the invisible metaphysics secretly underwriting and accounting for our experiences; we aren’t even clear on the phenomenology (appearances) or ontology (observable posits) of the theory, treated as mere formalism.
This isn’t necessarily true. Consider that the GRW interpretation has been pretty much falsified by Van Harlingen’s work at UIUC (macroscopic current superposition in SQUIDs). Most of the interpretations rely on different postulates than traditional Copenhagen quantum so there can be (and generally are) differences. However, to date, most of those differences aren’t measurable.
Similarly, we call many-worlds an “interpretation” even though no one has figured out how to actually make predictions with it. The difference between “interpretation” and “theory” is a bit loose.
I am not familiar with the GRW theory, but, like most other objective collapse models and unlike [the lowest common denominator] Copenhagen, it appears to be more than an interpretation, so no wonder that it can be falsified.
Anyway, my definition of an interpretation is “same math, same predictions, different invisible underlying ontology”. If your definition is different, feel free to state it.
Almost all “interpretations” (using the word as used in the literature) of quantum mechanics use different axioms, and its a mathematical question as to whether or not the theories make the same predictions. Many stochastic “interpretations” modify the Schroedinger equation, for instance. Even many-worlds can’t be proven as an interpretation using your definition (no one has shown it actually leads to the same predictions as Copenhagen).
Its an unfortunate artifact of the literature on various approaches quantum mechanics that the words interpretation and theory often over-load each other, but its the reality we live in.
If that’s your definition, then it’s an empirical question whether a given model is an interpretation, because it’s often contingent and difficult-to-demonstrate that a given ontology is necessarily ‘invisible’, as opposed to ‘potentially-testable-but-as-yet-untested’. Impossibility proofs about future scientific experiments are no easy task. So we can only speculate about whether Many Worlds, Bohmian Mechanics, Collapse theories, etc. are ‘interpretations’ in your sense.
(And by ‘invisible’ I gather you mean ‘empirically equivalent to a certain set of rivals’—so whether something’s an interpretation is always relative to other models, the real predicate is interpretation-compared-to-x.)