David is saying standard ignorance models are flawed because they do not consider the possibility of people who do not realize they might be tricked. I am responding to David’s assumption.
His claim is that people enter into contracts without contemplating that they might get tricked. They may be aware of the fact that people like them get tricked in contracts like the ones they are signing, but they simply trust the salesmen, or they just decide they need a credit card, sign next to the X, and don’t think about it much further. They sign in near-mode, and analyze policy in far-mode. Your position requires that they are completely unaware of the possibility that they might be tricked in all contracts, not just specific ones they enter into; I think this would require both contracts and policy analysis to occur in near-mode. Your position would also require that they like the options that the law removes, and/or that they are aware of the costs imposed by such laws. In other words, they don’t understand that a credit card contract could contain hidden fees, but they do understand that by blocking hidden fees in credit card transactions, the profitability of such transactions will fall and credit will contract as businesses can no longer exploit consumers. Such a combination of ignorance and sophistication seems rather unlikely.
Moreover, your inference that people who are unaware of being swindled should object to anti-swindling laws makes no sense. People may be unaware that there are rat guts in their sausage; this does not mean they would object to a law that bans putting rat guts in sausage.
His point isn’t about people who do not realize they might be tricked; it’s about people who do not realize that a specific contract is (potentially) tricking them. They can still be aware, in the abstract, that there are businesses out there that will try to trick them, and even that the one they are currently dealing with might be trying to trick them. They need merely be unaware of the fact that they are actually being tricked, which is a requisite of being tricked in the first place.
When you buy sausage at the store, you don’t make a significant effort to ensure that there are no rat guts in the particular brand you buy. However, if you’ve heard that sausage occasionally has rat guts in it, you may reasonably support laws that ensure sausage does not contain such ingredients, even if it costs you a few pennies.
Your position requires people believe themselves to be wholly immune to deception, which is absurd. David’s actual position merely requires they be unaware of the deception in a specific contract, not that they be unaware of their ability to be deceived.
David is saying standard ignorance models are flawed because they do not consider the possibility of people who do not realize they might be tricked. I am responding to David’s assumption.
That isn’t his claim.
His claim is that people enter into contracts without contemplating that they might get tricked. They may be aware of the fact that people like them get tricked in contracts like the ones they are signing, but they simply trust the salesmen, or they just decide they need a credit card, sign next to the X, and don’t think about it much further. They sign in near-mode, and analyze policy in far-mode. Your position requires that they are completely unaware of the possibility that they might be tricked in all contracts, not just specific ones they enter into; I think this would require both contracts and policy analysis to occur in near-mode. Your position would also require that they like the options that the law removes, and/or that they are aware of the costs imposed by such laws. In other words, they don’t understand that a credit card contract could contain hidden fees, but they do understand that by blocking hidden fees in credit card transactions, the profitability of such transactions will fall and credit will contract as businesses can no longer exploit consumers. Such a combination of ignorance and sophistication seems rather unlikely.
Moreover, your inference that people who are unaware of being swindled should object to anti-swindling laws makes no sense. People may be unaware that there are rat guts in their sausage; this does not mean they would object to a law that bans putting rat guts in sausage.
That just isn’t what he is saying.
His point isn’t about people who do not realize they might be tricked; it’s about people who do not realize that a specific contract is (potentially) tricking them. They can still be aware, in the abstract, that there are businesses out there that will try to trick them, and even that the one they are currently dealing with might be trying to trick them. They need merely be unaware of the fact that they are actually being tricked, which is a requisite of being tricked in the first place.
When you buy sausage at the store, you don’t make a significant effort to ensure that there are no rat guts in the particular brand you buy. However, if you’ve heard that sausage occasionally has rat guts in it, you may reasonably support laws that ensure sausage does not contain such ingredients, even if it costs you a few pennies.
Your position requires people believe themselves to be wholly immune to deception, which is absurd. David’s actual position merely requires they be unaware of the deception in a specific contract, not that they be unaware of their ability to be deceived.