I do draw a distinction between value and ethics. Although my current best guess is that decision theory does in some sense reduce ethics to a subset of value, I do think it’s a subset worth distinguishing. For example, I still have a concept of evaluating how ethical someone is, based on how good they are at paying causal costs for larger acausal gains.
I think the Goodness of Reality principle is maybe a bit confusingly named, because it’s not really a claim about the existence of some objective notion of Good that applies to reality per se, and is instead a claim about how our opinions about reality are fundamentally distorted by false conceptions of who we are. I think metaethics crucially relies on us not being confused about who we are, which is how I see the two relating.
I do draw a distinction between value and ethics. Although my current best guess is that decision theory does in some sense reduce ethics to a subset of value, I do think it’s a subset worth distinguishing. For example, I still have a concept of evaluating how ethical someone is, based on how good they are at paying causal costs for larger acausal gains.
I think the Goodness of Reality principle is maybe a bit confusingly named, because it’s not really a claim about the existence of some objective notion of Good that applies to reality per se, and is instead a claim about how our opinions about reality are fundamentally distorted by false conceptions of who we are. I think metaethics crucially relies on us not being confused about who we are, which is how I see the two relating.