Lets look at a relatively non-controversial example. Say people are arguing about conciousness. As it turns out I do not agree with Dan Dennett’s point of view on this topic. However lets say I start making for the Dennett point of view. How might I be hurting by doing this? I can think of some plausible mechanisms:
1) I might be disrupting Aumannian Agreement. However in most arguments I don’t see many aumannian processes at work, people are rather reluctant to change their views. I agree its important to state your beleifs accurately in situations with substantial aumannian processes ex: A double crux or a friend asking me for advice.
2) I am slightly distorting the sample of community opinion. I suppose this is a real harm but it seems slight. In addition trying to gauge the distribution of community opinion based on observing discussions seems problematic anyway. The majority of people do not comment much at all. Its better to look at various community surveys. Some questions are not represented on surveys but in those cases its very hard to get info anyway.
3) Maybe since I disagree with Dennett I will probably argue for his views badly? I think this sort of issue comes up alot for people trying to ‘steelman’. However since I am trying to persuade my incentives are alligned with arguing well. I am not trying to ‘steelman’ Dennett then shoot down his views. I am actually trying to spread them. Various debate organizations seem to think its possible to argue well for many sides of an argument. The legal profession also seems to assume you can argue well for ‘both sides’. (though in the conciousness debate there are more than two sides).
4) Maybe its actively bad to ‘spread wrong ideas’. First off this seems like it conflicts alot with the ideology around having a ‘marketplace of ideas’. People can evaluate ideas for themselves, I don’t think exposing them to Dennett’s pint of view is hurting them (or hurting society). Maybe this is a crux but I think the concept of a marketplace of ideas has proven very beneficial (even if its an over simplication). Secondly I don’t know Dennett is wrong! I should not privilege my own opinion too much.
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Can you explain why you think this sort of behavior is harmful and which norms are being broken?
Why should I seriously engage with anything you’re saying, given that you just admitted that you find it perfectly fine to say things that you don’t believe, just to win an argument? If you’re willing to say whatever it takes to be persuasive, then I am, in effect, not talking to an actual person with actual beliefs—I’m talking to some sort of mutable simulacrum of a person, who has no beliefs, no values, no interests, etc. I can’t rely on this simulacrum to be honest, or to be charitable, etc.; it can have no consistent character at all. Why should I waste my time conversing with such an entity? I rather prefer to deal with humans!
That aside, I notice that in your question, you assume a strictly harm-based ethics—and not only that, but, apparently, an act-utilitarian ethics. I reject that assumption. I am not a utilitarian, much less an act utilitarian.
As for “which norms are being broken”, I think you know the answer to that one perfectly well. We have norms against saying things you don’t believe. We have norms against hypocrisy, and against two-facedness. We have norms against lying, and against deception in general. All of these are being broken.
Lets look at a relatively non-controversial example. Say people are arguing about conciousness. As it turns out I do not agree with Dan Dennett’s point of view on this topic. However lets say I start making for the Dennett point of view. How might I be hurting by doing this? I can think of some plausible mechanisms:
1) I might be disrupting Aumannian Agreement. However in most arguments I don’t see many aumannian processes at work, people are rather reluctant to change their views. I agree its important to state your beleifs accurately in situations with substantial aumannian processes ex: A double crux or a friend asking me for advice.
2) I am slightly distorting the sample of community opinion. I suppose this is a real harm but it seems slight. In addition trying to gauge the distribution of community opinion based on observing discussions seems problematic anyway. The majority of people do not comment much at all. Its better to look at various community surveys. Some questions are not represented on surveys but in those cases its very hard to get info anyway.
3) Maybe since I disagree with Dennett I will probably argue for his views badly? I think this sort of issue comes up alot for people trying to ‘steelman’. However since I am trying to persuade my incentives are alligned with arguing well. I am not trying to ‘steelman’ Dennett then shoot down his views. I am actually trying to spread them. Various debate organizations seem to think its possible to argue well for many sides of an argument. The legal profession also seems to assume you can argue well for ‘both sides’. (though in the conciousness debate there are more than two sides).
4) Maybe its actively bad to ‘spread wrong ideas’. First off this seems like it conflicts alot with the ideology around having a ‘marketplace of ideas’. People can evaluate ideas for themselves, I don’t think exposing them to Dennett’s pint of view is hurting them (or hurting society). Maybe this is a crux but I think the concept of a marketplace of ideas has proven very beneficial (even if its an over simplication). Secondly I don’t know Dennett is wrong! I should not privilege my own opinion too much.
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Can you explain why you think this sort of behavior is harmful and which norms are being broken?
Why should I seriously engage with anything you’re saying, given that you just admitted that you find it perfectly fine to say things that you don’t believe, just to win an argument? If you’re willing to say whatever it takes to be persuasive, then I am, in effect, not talking to an actual person with actual beliefs—I’m talking to some sort of mutable simulacrum of a person, who has no beliefs, no values, no interests, etc. I can’t rely on this simulacrum to be honest, or to be charitable, etc.; it can have no consistent character at all. Why should I waste my time conversing with such an entity? I rather prefer to deal with humans!
That aside, I notice that in your question, you assume a strictly harm-based ethics—and not only that, but, apparently, an act-utilitarian ethics. I reject that assumption. I am not a utilitarian, much less an act utilitarian.
As for “which norms are being broken”, I think you know the answer to that one perfectly well. We have norms against saying things you don’t believe. We have norms against hypocrisy, and against two-facedness. We have norms against lying, and against deception in general. All of these are being broken.
Don’t use your answer to an argument to make a point about (your interpretation of) another argument.