So, in the end, I think we must allow the use of brains to think about thinking; and the use of evolved brains to think about evolution; and the use of inductive brains to think about induction; and the use of brains with an Occam prior to think about whether the universe appears to be simple; for these things we really cannot unwind entirely, even when we have reason to distrust them. Strange loops through the meta level, I think, are not the same as circular logic.
And this have a lot of similarities with my previous conclusion (with significant differences about circular logic and meta loops)
a non-contradicting collection of self-referential statement that covers the epistemology and axiology
Eliezer ruminates on foundations and wrestles with the difficulties quite a bit in the Metaethics sequence, for example:
Where Recursive Justification Hits Bottom
Fundamental Doubts
Thank you. This reply actually answer the first part of my question.
The ‘working’ presuppositions include:
Induction
Occam’s razor
I will quote most important part from Fundamental Doubts
And this have a lot of similarities with my previous conclusion (with significant differences about circular logic and meta loops)