So there is no need to use the term “real” except maybe as a shorthand for the territory in the map-territory model (which is an oft useful model, but only a model).
FYI, “territory” means “territory”, not map.
. On the other hand, you can probably agree that removing objective reality from one’s ontology would make MWI an unnecessary addition to a perfectly good model called relational quantum mechanics.
Model of what? If you subtract the ontology from an interpretation, what are you left with knowledge of?
In this and your previous comment, you write as though as though rQM is a different formalism, a different theory,
leading to different results. It isn’t.
On the other hand, you can probably agree that removing objective reality from one’s ontology would make MWI an unnecessary addition to a perfectly good model called relational quantum mechanics.
In principle rQM could suggest a different mental picture, and one better capable of inspiring further models that will make successful predictions. (Assuming shminux’s bizarre positivist-like approach admits the existence of mental pictures.) The “better capable” part seems unlikely to this layman. Feynman’s path integrals have a very MWI-like feel to me, and Feynman himself shared that impression when he wrote the book with Hibbs. But since paths that go back in time seem to pose a problem for Eliezer’s causality-based approach, perhaps shminux has some reason for preferring rQM that I don’t see. I’m still betting against it.
FYI, “territory” means “territory”, not map.
Model of what? If you subtract the ontology from an interpretation, what are you left with knowledge of?
A basis to build a testable model on.
In this and your previous comment, you write as though as though rQM is a different formalism, a different theory, leading to different results. It isn’t.
Feel free to quote the statement that led you to such a strange conclusion.
and
In principle rQM could suggest a different mental picture, and one better capable of inspiring further models that will make successful predictions. (Assuming shminux’s bizarre positivist-like approach admits the existence of mental pictures.) The “better capable” part seems unlikely to this layman. Feynman’s path integrals have a very MWI-like feel to me, and Feynman himself shared that impression when he wrote the book with Hibbs. But since paths that go back in time seem to pose a problem for Eliezer’s causality-based approach, perhaps shminux has some reason for preferring rQM that I don’t see. I’m still betting against it.