QM is computable. rQM doesnt change that. If an observer wants to do quantum cosmology, they can observe the universe, not from nowhere, but from their perspective, store observations and compute with them. Map-wise, nothing much has changed.
Territory-wise, it looks like the universe can’t be a (classical) computer. Is that a problem?
I can see how your conclusion follows from that assumption, but the assumption is as strange as the conclusion. Ideally, an argument should proceed from plausible premises.
“The universe is not anything that can even be conceived as existing in a classical view-from nowhere style” also means that the universe can’t be modeled on a computer (classical or otherwise). From a complexity theory point of view, this makes the rQM cosmology an exceptionally bad one, since you must have to add something uncomputable to QM to make this true (if there is even any logical model that makes this true at all).
The fact that you can still computably model a specific observer’s subjective perspective isn’t really relevant.
Out of the box, a classical computer doesn’t represent the ontology of rQM because all information has an observer-independent representation, but s software layer can hide literal representations in the way a
LISP gensym does. Uncomputability is not required.
In any case, classical computability isn’t a good index of complexity. It’s an index of how close something is to a classical computer. Problems are harder or easier to solve according to the technology used to solve them. That’s why people don’t write device drivers in LISP.
QM is computable. rQM doesnt change that. If an observer wants to do quantum cosmology, they can observe the universe, not from nowhere, but from their perspective, store observations and compute with them. Map-wise, nothing much has changed.
Territory-wise, it looks like the universe can’t be a (classical) computer. Is that a problem?
As I understand it, any quantum computer can be modeled on a classical one, possibly with exponential slowdown.
Be modeled doesn’t mean be.
I guess that’s the root of our disagreement about instrumentalism.
The dictionary seems to be on my side.
I can see how your conclusion follows from that assumption, but the assumption is as strange as the conclusion. Ideally, an argument should proceed from plausible premises.
Disengaging due to lack of convergence.
Well, that’s one way of avoiding update.
“The universe is not anything that can even be conceived as existing in a classical view-from nowhere style” also means that the universe can’t be modeled on a computer (classical or otherwise). From a complexity theory point of view, this makes the rQM cosmology an exceptionally bad one, since you must have to add something uncomputable to QM to make this true (if there is even any logical model that makes this true at all).
The fact that you can still computably model a specific observer’s subjective perspective isn’t really relevant.
Out of the box, a classical computer doesn’t represent the ontology of rQM because all information has an observer-independent representation, but s software layer can hide literal representations in the way a LISP gensym does. Uncomputability is not required.
In any case, classical computability isn’t a good index of complexity. It’s an index of how close something is to a classical computer. Problems are harder or easier to solve according to the technology used to solve them. That’s why people don’t write device drivers in LISP.
Um, computability has very little to do with “classical” computers. It’s a very general idea relating to the existence of any algorithm at all.
Uncomputability isn’t needed to model the ontology of rQM,