If different people in the group make sensible and crazy interpretations, and you’re arguing with someone who claims to be making only the sensible interpretation, I’d expect that that person would at least be willing to
1) admit that other members of the group are saying things that are crazy. They don’t have to preemptively say it ahead of time, but they could at least say it when they are challenged on it.
2) treat known crazy-talking people as crazy-talking people, rather than glossing over their craziness in the interests of group solidarity.
I’m also very suspicious when the person with the reasonable interpretation benefits too much from the existence of (and the failure to challenge) the person with the crazy interpretation. His refusal to condemn the other guy then looks suspicious. The term for this is “good cop, bad cop”, and the fact that we have already have a term for it should hint that it actually happens.
And finally, sometimes as a practical matter, it’s necessary to go against the bad cops. If the motte is some kind of reasonable objection to James Damore, and the bailey is “Damore said (list of things he didn’t actually say)” and the bailey is all over the media and Internet and is used to attack engineers, that bailey is the one to be concerned about and the one to focus most of my effort against. It’s not just argument, it’s argument in service of a goal, in this case, not to be stomped on by people using baileys.
His refusal to condemn the other guy then looks suspicious.
This. I can’t stop someone from believing that “LW believes [a stupid thing]” even if I am totally convinced that LW does not believe any of that, but I can make a clear statement that “I do not believe [the stupid thing]”. And, who knows, if many people on LW make the same statement, maybe the person will update on the opinion that “LW believes [the stupid thing]”.
(Or we get the frustrating outcome when the person says “well, Viliam, good for you to not believe [the stupid thing] but I am still convinced that LW believes that”, in which case… well, at least I tried.)
But if someone refuses to take this step, and their approach is “well, I do not agree with X” in private, but at the same time they take great care to be never seen saying “X is wrong” publicly, then I believe I have a good reason to suspect them of defending one version of the belief publicly, and only falling back to another version privately when caught. (“Hey, my group totally does not believe X! That’s just a lie spread by our enemies!” “So, would you be willing to go to your group’s communication channel and post ‘by the way, X is false, obviously’?” “No, why would I do that?” And the next day someone else from the group posts “X” and this person will share the post on social networks.)
If different people in the group make sensible and crazy interpretations, and you’re arguing with someone who claims to be making only the sensible interpretation, I’d expect that that person would at least be willing to
1) admit that other members of the group are saying things that are crazy. They don’t have to preemptively say it ahead of time, but they could at least say it when they are challenged on it.
2) treat known crazy-talking people as crazy-talking people, rather than glossing over their craziness in the interests of group solidarity.
I’m also very suspicious when the person with the reasonable interpretation benefits too much from the existence of (and the failure to challenge) the person with the crazy interpretation. His refusal to condemn the other guy then looks suspicious. The term for this is “good cop, bad cop”, and the fact that we have already have a term for it should hint that it actually happens.
And finally, sometimes as a practical matter, it’s necessary to go against the bad cops. If the motte is some kind of reasonable objection to James Damore, and the bailey is “Damore said (list of things he didn’t actually say)” and the bailey is all over the media and Internet and is used to attack engineers, that bailey is the one to be concerned about and the one to focus most of my effort against. It’s not just argument, it’s argument in service of a goal, in this case, not to be stomped on by people using baileys.
This. I can’t stop someone from believing that “LW believes [a stupid thing]” even if I am totally convinced that LW does not believe any of that, but I can make a clear statement that “I do not believe [the stupid thing]”. And, who knows, if many people on LW make the same statement, maybe the person will update on the opinion that “LW believes [the stupid thing]”.
(Or we get the frustrating outcome when the person says “well, Viliam, good for you to not believe [the stupid thing] but I am still convinced that LW believes that”, in which case… well, at least I tried.)
But if someone refuses to take this step, and their approach is “well, I do not agree with X” in private, but at the same time they take great care to be never seen saying “X is wrong” publicly, then I believe I have a good reason to suspect them of defending one version of the belief publicly, and only falling back to another version privately when caught. (“Hey, my group totally does not believe X! That’s just a lie spread by our enemies!” “So, would you be willing to go to your group’s communication channel and post ‘by the way, X is false, obviously’?” “No, why would I do that?” And the next day someone else from the group posts “X” and this person will share the post on social networks.)