Avoid false dichotomies when reciting the litany of Tarski.
Suppose I were arguing about whether it’s morally permissible to eat vegetables. I might stop in the middle and say:
If it is morally permissible to eat vegetables, I desire to believe that it is morally permissible to eat vegetables.
If it is morally impermissible to eat vegetables, I desire to believe that it is morally impermissible to eat vegetables.
Let me not become attached to beliefs I may not want.
But this ignores the possibility that it’s neither morally permissible nor morally impermissible to eat vegetables, because (for instance) things don’t have moral properties, or morality doesn’t have permissible vs impermissible categories, or whether or not it’s morally permissible or impermissible to eat vegetables depends on whether or not it’s Tuesday.
Luckily, when you’re saying the litany of Tarski, you have a prompt to actually think about the negation of the belief in question. Which might help you avoid this mistake.
Avoid false dichotomies when reciting the litany of Tarski.
Suppose I were arguing about whether it’s morally permissible to eat vegetables. I might stop in the middle and say:
But this ignores the possibility that it’s neither morally permissible nor morally impermissible to eat vegetables, because (for instance) things don’t have moral properties, or morality doesn’t have permissible vs impermissible categories, or whether or not it’s morally permissible or impermissible to eat vegetables depends on whether or not it’s Tuesday.
Luckily, when you’re saying the litany of Tarski, you have a prompt to actually think about the negation of the belief in question. Which might help you avoid this mistake.
Alternate title: negation is a little tricky.