Maybe there are some who need coddling, but that’s a question of strategy, not clear thinking. If we’re aiming for clarity, then what each personally should personally aim for is to just admit when they’re wrong and abandon any dishonest comforts like calling God “the spirit within all of humanity.”
I am not talking about coddling anyone. I am talking about caring about the truth rather than about what words people use.
It is usually a mistake to “just admit when they’re wrong,” because even people who are wrong usually saw some truth as well, so if they abandon everything, they will be abandoning the true part of what they believed together with the false part.
It is not a “dishonest comfort” to use the word “God” for something different from what other people use it for, as long as you know what you are using it for.
My basic objection to your proposal is this: it comes across as “Abandon your tribe and come over to mine! Your tribe is bad and mine is good!” I object to that proposal because there are not “good” and “bad” tribes. Tribes are just people, made up of a mixture of good and bad, in every case.
And the fact that you are so interested in people not using the word “God,” even to refer to something that exists, suggests that it not only comes across in that way, but it is in fact what you are doing. If you simply cared about the truth, you would not care what words people used to express it, as long as they believed the truth.
Have you read “A Human’s Guide to Words” from the sequences? I recommend it highly, and I think it clears up our disagreement.
If we were computers, or perfect philosophers, you would be completely correct. As it stands, you’re still mostly correct. Unfortunately, humans have certain defects which require us to take certain precautions, including caring about connotations as well as denotations, as also history of usage and so on.
Yes, I’ve read the post you mention. But since you didn’t fully spell it out, I’m not sure what you’re intending to say. I can think of at least two interpretations, one I would disagree with, and one I would agree with.
1) You might be saying that it is impossible to do what I am suggesting given the way people actually relate to words. In this case I would disagree, and I also suspect that you would not apply such a principle consistently, e.g. to speaking about the gender of trans people.
2) You might simply be saying that doing what I am proposing has an epistemic cost. In that case I would agree. For example, take someone who is raised believing in God. He might think, “God is the principle or principles most responsible for the world.” Understood in that way, God might very well be the laws of nature or something like that. But if the person previously believed that God was a person, then continuing to speak in that way will make him tend to think “as if” the world was caused by a person, even if he specifically denies it. I agree with that, but have two things to say about it:
First, for such a person, saying that “God does not exist,” also has an epistemic cost. Because this will tend to make him think “as if” there were no principles responsible for the world. It is not obvious which cost is worse. Personally I think that “there are no principles responsible for the world” is falser than “a person is responsible for the world,” even though both are false. Of course you can respond that you simply don’t accept the false thing: but that is possible whether you speak the one way or the other.
Second, there are non-epistemic costs and benefits, and you have to consider these when you consider which way to speak. This is why I brought up the tribal issue: even if the epistemic cost of speaking of God as something existing is higher than speaking as an atheist, it might turn out (at least for people who are members of some communities) that overall the cost of saying that God does not exist is higher.
You can compare this with reading fiction. There can be no reasonable doubt that reading fiction has an epistemic cost, and that in general it will lead you to think “as if” reality were more like the story than it is. But reading fiction can also have epistemic benefits, and it definitely has non-epistemic benefits, so that most people believe (as I do) that the overall benefits outweigh the costs.
Impossible overstates it. It is sufficiently difficult as to not be worth using it, making things more difficult than they have to be. This, again, relates to clarity. If there are people who need unclarity, that’s a strategic concern, not one of understanding things as they are.
In the case of God, I think “God does not exist” is sufficiently obvious. People aren’t going to stop expecting the universe to behave consistently because they realized “God does not exist” is probably true. As such, they have effectively distinguished God from the laws of the universe.
I could imagine other cases where the effect you describe is stronger, though. It’s an interesting point.
And, of course, again I recognize the non-epistemic part of this decision. If we’re pursuing clarity, we should avoid these ambiguous and loaded terms and use others. If it’s a question of strategy, we might not WANT that complete clarity, sure.
I’m thinking this might be the majority of our perceived disagreement. If so, I want to emphasize again that my strict lines are only talking about epistemics, about clarity. I recognize that there may be strategic reasons to avoid that clarity.
In other words, I’m not saying “say God when we don’t mean God” BAD, “not so say” GOOD.
I’m saying “say God when we don’t mean God” UNCLEAR, “not so say” CLEAR.
We probably mostly agree about the practical part of this, although I suspect that due to lack of experience, you underestimate the practical costs of verbal atheism for many people. This at least is suggested by your previous reference to “coddling” people.
I do not think we agree on the epistemic issue yet, since you seem to be saying that there are no epistemic costs to atheism. It may or may not be possible to resolve this disagreement, depending on an issue I will discuss shortly.
But first, when I spoke of an epistemic cost, I did not mean adopting a false belief, or at least not necessarily. I meant a trend toward something false. That is why I used the phrase “as if.” So for example one of the reasons that most of us are not much concerned about the epistemic costs of reading fiction is that there is no particular false belief that reading fiction forces one to adopt: there is a simply a trend towards positions more similar to the ones expressed in the fiction. So there is an epistemic cost, but one is not forced to adopt a false belief.
This is relevant to your comment that “people aren’t going to stop expecting the universe to behave consistently because they realized ‘God does not exist’ is probably true.” Basically you are saying that this will not force people to adopt a false belief. I agree. But I say that there will be a trend towards a false belief (and I will explain that shortly.) The same thing is true if you speak of God as the principle(s) responsible for the universe. If a person says that God is such a principle, but not a person, they will not expect God to e.g. speak with them personally and give them a revelation. So they have effectively distinguished “God” or the principles responsible for the universe from the personal God of theism. But there will still be a trend towards false beliefs. That is true, in my opinion, on both sides of this issue.
Getting to the point of our disagreement, I think there is an actual false belief that many atheists adopt, and that many others trend towards adopting. Now it may be that you yourself hold this belief. If so, then for me it will be evidence that I am right, since it will show that you have fallen prey to the epistemic cost that I am talking about. But since in this case you will not agree that your belief is false, for you it will be evidence that you are right: you will simply think that I have fallen prey to the opposite epistemic cost.
Thus: “as such, they have effectively distinguished God from the laws of universe.” Not if they think the laws of the universe do not exist; for in that case, just as they say that God does not exist, they also say that the laws of the universe do not exist. In other words, we can say that things fall because of the law of gravity. But what is the law of gravity, and where is it found? If it is nothing but an idea in our minds, and nothing at all in the real world, then the law of gravity does not exist, and the fact that things fall is a brute fact which has nothing responsible for it. Many atheists think that this account is true, and in that way they do indeed believe that there are no principles responsible for the world.
As I said previously, I think that this position is falser than theism. Saying that there is literally nothing at all responsible for things is falser than saying that a person is responsible, although both are false. But as I said, you may hold this belief yourself, and in that case, this would indicate to me that I am right about the epistemic cost of atheism, but it would indicate the opposite to you.
I think Viliam is right.
Maybe there are some who need coddling, but that’s a question of strategy, not clear thinking. If we’re aiming for clarity, then what each personally should personally aim for is to just admit when they’re wrong and abandon any dishonest comforts like calling God “the spirit within all of humanity.”
I am not talking about coddling anyone. I am talking about caring about the truth rather than about what words people use.
It is usually a mistake to “just admit when they’re wrong,” because even people who are wrong usually saw some truth as well, so if they abandon everything, they will be abandoning the true part of what they believed together with the false part.
It is not a “dishonest comfort” to use the word “God” for something different from what other people use it for, as long as you know what you are using it for.
My basic objection to your proposal is this: it comes across as “Abandon your tribe and come over to mine! Your tribe is bad and mine is good!” I object to that proposal because there are not “good” and “bad” tribes. Tribes are just people, made up of a mixture of good and bad, in every case.
And the fact that you are so interested in people not using the word “God,” even to refer to something that exists, suggests that it not only comes across in that way, but it is in fact what you are doing. If you simply cared about the truth, you would not care what words people used to express it, as long as they believed the truth.
Have you read “A Human’s Guide to Words” from the sequences? I recommend it highly, and I think it clears up our disagreement.
If we were computers, or perfect philosophers, you would be completely correct. As it stands, you’re still mostly correct. Unfortunately, humans have certain defects which require us to take certain precautions, including caring about connotations as well as denotations, as also history of usage and so on.
Yes, I’ve read the post you mention. But since you didn’t fully spell it out, I’m not sure what you’re intending to say. I can think of at least two interpretations, one I would disagree with, and one I would agree with.
1) You might be saying that it is impossible to do what I am suggesting given the way people actually relate to words. In this case I would disagree, and I also suspect that you would not apply such a principle consistently, e.g. to speaking about the gender of trans people.
2) You might simply be saying that doing what I am proposing has an epistemic cost. In that case I would agree. For example, take someone who is raised believing in God. He might think, “God is the principle or principles most responsible for the world.” Understood in that way, God might very well be the laws of nature or something like that. But if the person previously believed that God was a person, then continuing to speak in that way will make him tend to think “as if” the world was caused by a person, even if he specifically denies it. I agree with that, but have two things to say about it:
First, for such a person, saying that “God does not exist,” also has an epistemic cost. Because this will tend to make him think “as if” there were no principles responsible for the world. It is not obvious which cost is worse. Personally I think that “there are no principles responsible for the world” is falser than “a person is responsible for the world,” even though both are false. Of course you can respond that you simply don’t accept the false thing: but that is possible whether you speak the one way or the other.
Second, there are non-epistemic costs and benefits, and you have to consider these when you consider which way to speak. This is why I brought up the tribal issue: even if the epistemic cost of speaking of God as something existing is higher than speaking as an atheist, it might turn out (at least for people who are members of some communities) that overall the cost of saying that God does not exist is higher.
You can compare this with reading fiction. There can be no reasonable doubt that reading fiction has an epistemic cost, and that in general it will lead you to think “as if” reality were more like the story than it is. But reading fiction can also have epistemic benefits, and it definitely has non-epistemic benefits, so that most people believe (as I do) that the overall benefits outweigh the costs.
Impossible overstates it. It is sufficiently difficult as to not be worth using it, making things more difficult than they have to be. This, again, relates to clarity. If there are people who need unclarity, that’s a strategic concern, not one of understanding things as they are.
In the case of God, I think “God does not exist” is sufficiently obvious. People aren’t going to stop expecting the universe to behave consistently because they realized “God does not exist” is probably true. As such, they have effectively distinguished God from the laws of the universe.
I could imagine other cases where the effect you describe is stronger, though. It’s an interesting point.
And, of course, again I recognize the non-epistemic part of this decision. If we’re pursuing clarity, we should avoid these ambiguous and loaded terms and use others. If it’s a question of strategy, we might not WANT that complete clarity, sure.
I’m thinking this might be the majority of our perceived disagreement. If so, I want to emphasize again that my strict lines are only talking about epistemics, about clarity. I recognize that there may be strategic reasons to avoid that clarity.
In other words, I’m not saying “say God when we don’t mean God” BAD, “not so say” GOOD.
I’m saying “say God when we don’t mean God” UNCLEAR, “not so say” CLEAR.
We probably mostly agree about the practical part of this, although I suspect that due to lack of experience, you underestimate the practical costs of verbal atheism for many people. This at least is suggested by your previous reference to “coddling” people.
I do not think we agree on the epistemic issue yet, since you seem to be saying that there are no epistemic costs to atheism. It may or may not be possible to resolve this disagreement, depending on an issue I will discuss shortly.
But first, when I spoke of an epistemic cost, I did not mean adopting a false belief, or at least not necessarily. I meant a trend toward something false. That is why I used the phrase “as if.” So for example one of the reasons that most of us are not much concerned about the epistemic costs of reading fiction is that there is no particular false belief that reading fiction forces one to adopt: there is a simply a trend towards positions more similar to the ones expressed in the fiction. So there is an epistemic cost, but one is not forced to adopt a false belief.
This is relevant to your comment that “people aren’t going to stop expecting the universe to behave consistently because they realized ‘God does not exist’ is probably true.” Basically you are saying that this will not force people to adopt a false belief. I agree. But I say that there will be a trend towards a false belief (and I will explain that shortly.) The same thing is true if you speak of God as the principle(s) responsible for the universe. If a person says that God is such a principle, but not a person, they will not expect God to e.g. speak with them personally and give them a revelation. So they have effectively distinguished “God” or the principles responsible for the universe from the personal God of theism. But there will still be a trend towards false beliefs. That is true, in my opinion, on both sides of this issue.
Getting to the point of our disagreement, I think there is an actual false belief that many atheists adopt, and that many others trend towards adopting. Now it may be that you yourself hold this belief. If so, then for me it will be evidence that I am right, since it will show that you have fallen prey to the epistemic cost that I am talking about. But since in this case you will not agree that your belief is false, for you it will be evidence that you are right: you will simply think that I have fallen prey to the opposite epistemic cost.
Thus: “as such, they have effectively distinguished God from the laws of universe.” Not if they think the laws of the universe do not exist; for in that case, just as they say that God does not exist, they also say that the laws of the universe do not exist. In other words, we can say that things fall because of the law of gravity. But what is the law of gravity, and where is it found? If it is nothing but an idea in our minds, and nothing at all in the real world, then the law of gravity does not exist, and the fact that things fall is a brute fact which has nothing responsible for it. Many atheists think that this account is true, and in that way they do indeed believe that there are no principles responsible for the world.
As I said previously, I think that this position is falser than theism. Saying that there is literally nothing at all responsible for things is falser than saying that a person is responsible, although both are false. But as I said, you may hold this belief yourself, and in that case, this would indicate to me that I am right about the epistemic cost of atheism, but it would indicate the opposite to you.