There are many pages in the sequences devoted to addressing mistakes made by individuals who identify as rational, who associate themselves with the traditions of modern science, and showing how to do better (not just arguments for a procedure that alleges to be more epistemically sound but how it produces better results in the real world.)
In devoting ourselves to the procedures that produce the best tangible results, we have found no reason to take a particular interest in producing criticisms of Popper. If Critical Rationalism distinguished itself as an epistemology that produced exceptional real world results, then matters would be different.
Hmm...I had something else written here, but had a thought causing me to be less certain of what I wrote. I do think Popper should be criticized by someone on this site, to point out what is wrong with his epistemology.
I agree that the whole Popper debate has passed the point of being silly; I’m ashamed to have continued to participate in it so far past the point where it was clear that further headway was unlikely to be made. I dispute the allegation of bad scholarship though.
The purpose isn’t to criticize the authors, but how the specified people behave. What the authors actually say is irrelevant; the criticisms of the people specified by the reference to “traditional rationalists” would be equally applicable whether Popper and Feynman’s writings on epistemology were complete nonsense or identical to what Eliezer is arguing.
There are, of course, wide selections of views encompassed in mainstream philosophy and traditional rationality, but the differences between them are only salient to the discussion if they distinguish them from the qualities that are being referenced.
I apologize, I edited my after submitting it. I did realize the issue of relevance, and I also think that my criticism was unfair in that I think the critique of “Traditional Rationality” is meant to be a methodological critique. I think the critique is very much in terms of valuing process (even a particular scholarly process) over results; which was also part of your point.
I guess I’m very much used to the scholarship process, and I’m not entirely clear on what “Traditional Rationality” ultimately is meant to imply, other than finding clues on various pages. I shouldn’t have expressed my confusion as disagreement.
No.
There are many pages in the sequences devoted to addressing mistakes made by individuals who identify as rational, who associate themselves with the traditions of modern science, and showing how to do better (not just arguments for a procedure that alleges to be more epistemically sound but how it produces better results in the real world.)
In devoting ourselves to the procedures that produce the best tangible results, we have found no reason to take a particular interest in producing criticisms of Popper. If Critical Rationalism distinguished itself as an epistemology that produced exceptional real world results, then matters would be different.
Hmm...I had something else written here, but had a thought causing me to be less certain of what I wrote. I do think Popper should be criticized by someone on this site, to point out what is wrong with his epistemology.
I agree that the whole Popper debate has passed the point of being silly; I’m ashamed to have continued to participate in it so far past the point where it was clear that further headway was unlikely to be made. I dispute the allegation of bad scholarship though.
The purpose isn’t to criticize the authors, but how the specified people behave. What the authors actually say is irrelevant; the criticisms of the people specified by the reference to “traditional rationalists” would be equally applicable whether Popper and Feynman’s writings on epistemology were complete nonsense or identical to what Eliezer is arguing.
There are, of course, wide selections of views encompassed in mainstream philosophy and traditional rationality, but the differences between them are only salient to the discussion if they distinguish them from the qualities that are being referenced.
I apologize, I edited my after submitting it. I did realize the issue of relevance, and I also think that my criticism was unfair in that I think the critique of “Traditional Rationality” is meant to be a methodological critique. I think the critique is very much in terms of valuing process (even a particular scholarly process) over results; which was also part of your point.
I guess I’m very much used to the scholarship process, and I’m not entirely clear on what “Traditional Rationality” ultimately is meant to imply, other than finding clues on various pages. I shouldn’t have expressed my confusion as disagreement.