For the examples I can think of (mostly philosophy of mind), it seems to me that the sciences would have emerged whether or not any progress was made while it was still considered the domain of philosophy. Are there better examples, where the “philosophical” progress was actually important for the later “scientific” progress?
It’s my impression that many scholars whom we now might regard as astronomers, mathematicians, or physicists — such as Galileo, Descartes, or Newton — thought of their own work as being in the tradition of philosophy, and were thought of as philosophers by their contemporaries.
For instance: Galileo expounded his astronomy (or Copernicus’s) in a work with the style of Socratic dialogues. Descartes’ Geometry was an appendix to his philosophical Discourse on Method. The social role of “scientist” didn’t exist until much later.
For the examples I can think of (mostly philosophy of mind), it seems to me that the sciences would have emerged whether or not any progress was made while it was still considered the domain of philosophy. Are there better examples, where the “philosophical” progress was actually important for the later “scientific” progress?
It’s my impression that many scholars whom we now might regard as astronomers, mathematicians, or physicists — such as Galileo, Descartes, or Newton — thought of their own work as being in the tradition of philosophy, and were thought of as philosophers by their contemporaries.
For instance: Galileo expounded his astronomy (or Copernicus’s) in a work with the style of Socratic dialogues. Descartes’ Geometry was an appendix to his philosophical Discourse on Method. The social role of “scientist” didn’t exist until much later.