Pr π∈ξ [U(⌈G⌉,π) ≥ U(⌈G⌉,G*)] is the probability that, for a random policy π∈ξ, that policy has worse utility than the policy G* its program dictates; in essence, how good G’s policies are compared to random policy selection
What prior over policies?
given g(G|U), we can infer the probability that an agent G has a given utility function U, as Pr[U] ∝ 2^-K(U) / Pr π∈ξ [U(⌈G⌉,π) ≥ U(⌈G⌉,G*)]) where ∝ means “is proportional to” and K(U) is the kolmogorov complexity of utility function U.
Suppose the prior over policies is max-entropy (uniform over all action sequences). If the number of “actions” is greater than the number of bits it takes to specify my brain[1], it seems like it would conclude that my utility function is something like “1 if {acts exactly like [insert exact copy of my brain] would}, else 0″.
Suppose the prior over policies is max-entropy (uniform over all action sequences). If the number of “actions” is greater than the number of bits it takes to specify my brain[1], it seems like it would conclude that my utility function is something like “1 if {acts exactly like [insert exact copy of my brain] would}, else 0″.
Yes. In fact I’m not even sure we need your assumption about bits. Say policies are sequences of actions, and suppose at each time step we have N actions available. Then, in our process of approximating your perfect/overfitted utility “1 if {acts exactly like [insert exact copy of my brain] would}, else 0”, adding one more specified action to our U can be understood as adding one more symbol to its generating program, and so incrementing K(U) by 1. But also, adding one more (perfect) specified action multiplies the denominator probability by 1N (since the prior is uniform). So as long as N>2, Pr[U] will be unbounded when approximating your utility.
And of course, this is solved by the simplicity prior, because this makes it easier for simple Us to achieve low denominator probability. So a way simpler U (less overfitted to G*) will achieve almost the same low denominator probability as your function, because the only policies that maximize U better than G* are too complex.
What prior over policies?
Suppose the prior over policies is max-entropy (uniform over all action sequences). If the number of “actions” is greater than the number of bits it takes to specify my brain[1], it seems like it would conclude that my utility function is something like “1 if {acts exactly like [insert exact copy of my brain] would}, else 0″.
Idk if this is plausible
Some kind of simplicity prior, as mentioned here.
Yes. In fact I’m not even sure we need your assumption about bits. Say policies are sequences of actions, and suppose at each time step we have N actions available. Then, in our process of approximating your perfect/overfitted utility “1 if {acts exactly like [insert exact copy of my brain] would}, else 0”, adding one more specified action to our U can be understood as adding one more symbol to its generating program, and so incrementing K(U) by 1. But also, adding one more (perfect) specified action multiplies the denominator probability by 1N (since the prior is uniform). So as long as N>2, Pr[U] will be unbounded when approximating your utility.
And of course, this is solved by the simplicity prior, because this makes it easier for simple Us to achieve low denominator probability. So a way simpler U (less overfitted to G*) will achieve almost the same low denominator probability as your function, because the only policies that maximize U better than G* are too complex.