If I throw away the notion of subjective anticipation, then how do I differentiate the chaotic universe from the orderly one?
One can differentiate in a sense with the relevancy razor. The conclusion given by the relevancy razor in this case is that it is safe to assume that you live in the orderly universe because if you lived in the chaotic one, then you have no hope of affecting reality—no hope of achieving any goal or carrying through any plan.
The relevancy razor is a principle of general applicability much like Occam’s Razor is a principle of general applicability.
Here is a statement of the relevancy razor:
Thinking entails the contemplation of “possible worlds”. It may be that you are unsure of the nature of the world you find yourself in or it may be that you are facing a decision, and how you decide will determine which possible world you will end up in. In either case, you have to think about possible worlds. The relevancy razor says that you do not have to contemplate any possible world in which you—the current you, not the you of the future—cannot affect reality. (Moreover, the greater your ability to affect reality in a possible world, the more attention you should pay to that possible world—just as the greater the probability of a possible world, the more attention you should pay to it.)
One other thing. Asking, What is the difference in anticipated experience between X and Y? is a useful and powerful question. I applaud Eliezer in encouraging its use.
But there is another question that is just as useful and powerful, namely, What can I predict or control in the objective world if X that I cannot predict or control if Y? (John David Garcia has encouraged the use of this question since the early 1980s.)
I prefer the second question because it does not tend to pull one into viewing subjective experience as what ultimately matters.
If you’re joining the conversation late, then hi, I’m Richard Hollerith, and I want you to believe that what matters in the end about you is your effect on reality, not your subjective experience.
(I do not say that subjective experience should be completely ignored: subjective experience can yield valuable information that is impractical or too expensive to acquire any other way, and that valuable information can, in turn, be used to affect reality, whichyou lived in the chaotic one, then you have no hope of affecting reality—no hope of achieving any goal or carrying through any plan.
I propose the relevancy razor as a principle of general applicability much like Occam’s Razor is a principle of general applicability.
Here is a statement of the relevancy razor:
Thinking entails the contemplation of “possible worlds”. It may be that you are unsure of the nature of the world you find yourself in or it may be that you are facing a decision, and how you decide will determine which possible world you will end up in. In either case, you have to think about possible worlds. The relevancy razor says that you do not have to contemplate any possible world in which you—the current you, not the you of the future—cannot affect reality. (Moreover, the greater your ability to affect reality in a possible world, the more attention you should pay to that possible world—just as the greater the probability of a possible world, the more attention you should pay to it.)
One other thing. Asking, What is the difference in anticipated experience between X and Y? is a useful and powerful question. I applaud Eliezer in encouraging its use.
But there is another question that is just as useful and powerful, namely, What can I predict or control in the objective world if X that I cannot predict or control if Y? (John David Garcia has encouraged the use of this question since the early 1980s.)
I prefer the second question because it does not tend to pull one into viewing subjective experience as what ultimately matters.
If you’re joining the conversation late, then hi, I’m Richard Hollerith, and I want you to believe that what matters in the end about you is your effect on reality, not your subjective experience.
(I do not say that subjective experience should be completely ignored: subjective experience can yield valuable information that is impractical or too expensive to acquire any other way, and that valuable information can, in turn, be used to affect reality, which, again, is the purpose of life.)
If I throw away the notion of subjective anticipation, then how do I differentiate the chaotic universe from the orderly one?
One can differentiate in a sense with the relevancy razor. The conclusion given by the relevancy razor in this case is that it is safe to assume that you live in the orderly universe because if you lived in the chaotic one, then you have no hope of affecting reality—no hope of achieving any goal or carrying through any plan.
The relevancy razor is a principle of general applicability much like Occam’s Razor is a principle of general applicability.
Here is a statement of the relevancy razor:
Thinking entails the contemplation of “possible worlds”. It may be that you are unsure of the nature of the world you find yourself in or it may be that you are facing a decision, and how you decide will determine which possible world you will end up in. In either case, you have to think about possible worlds. The relevancy razor says that you do not have to contemplate any possible world in which you—the current you, not the you of the future—cannot affect reality. (Moreover, the greater your ability to affect reality in a possible world, the more attention you should pay to that possible world—just as the greater the probability of a possible world, the more attention you should pay to it.)
One other thing. Asking, What is the difference in anticipated experience between X and Y? is a useful and powerful question. I applaud Eliezer in encouraging its use.
But there is another question that is just as useful and powerful, namely, What can I predict or control in the objective world if X that I cannot predict or control if Y? (John David Garcia has encouraged the use of this question since the early 1980s.)
I prefer the second question because it does not tend to pull one into viewing subjective experience as what ultimately matters.
If you’re joining the conversation late, then hi, I’m Richard Hollerith, and I want you to believe that what matters in the end about you is your effect on reality, not your subjective experience.
(I do not say that subjective experience should be completely ignored: subjective experience can yield valuable information that is impractical or too expensive to acquire any other way, and that valuable information can, in turn, be used to affect reality, whichyou lived in the chaotic one, then you have no hope of affecting reality—no hope of achieving any goal or carrying through any plan.
I propose the relevancy razor as a principle of general applicability much like Occam’s Razor is a principle of general applicability.
Here is a statement of the relevancy razor:
Thinking entails the contemplation of “possible worlds”. It may be that you are unsure of the nature of the world you find yourself in or it may be that you are facing a decision, and how you decide will determine which possible world you will end up in. In either case, you have to think about possible worlds. The relevancy razor says that you do not have to contemplate any possible world in which you—the current you, not the you of the future—cannot affect reality. (Moreover, the greater your ability to affect reality in a possible world, the more attention you should pay to that possible world—just as the greater the probability of a possible world, the more attention you should pay to it.)
One other thing. Asking, What is the difference in anticipated experience between X and Y? is a useful and powerful question. I applaud Eliezer in encouraging its use.
But there is another question that is just as useful and powerful, namely, What can I predict or control in the objective world if X that I cannot predict or control if Y? (John David Garcia has encouraged the use of this question since the early 1980s.)
I prefer the second question because it does not tend to pull one into viewing subjective experience as what ultimately matters.
If you’re joining the conversation late, then hi, I’m Richard Hollerith, and I want you to believe that what matters in the end about you is your effect on reality, not your subjective experience.
(I do not say that subjective experience should be completely ignored: subjective experience can yield valuable information that is impractical or too expensive to acquire any other way, and that valuable information can, in turn, be used to affect reality, which, again, is the purpose of life.)