There are weaker and stronger versions of this attribute. Some people will think to themselves, “Well, it’s important to use only valid arguments… but there was a sustained pattern of record highs worldwide over multiple years which does count as evidence, and that particular very hot day was a part of that pattern, so it’s valid evidence for global warming.” Other people will think to themselves, “I’d roll my eyes at someone who offers a single very cold day as an argument that global warming is false. So it can’t be okay to use a single very hot day to argue that global warming is true.”
I’d much rather buy a used car from the second person than the first person. I think I’d pay at least a 5% price premium.
Suppose the first person says his thing, and the second person responds with his thing. Might the first person not counter thusly:
“But maybe you shouldn’t roll your eyes at someone who offers a single very cold day as an argument that global warming is false. One person’s modus tollens is another’s modus ponens, after all.”
Where is the dishonesty in that? It seems entirely consistent, to me.
There will be a single very cold day occasionally regardless of whether global warming is true or false. Anyone who knows the phrase “modus tollens” ought to know that. That said, if two unenlightened ones are arguing back and forth in all sincerity by telling each other about the hot versus cold days they remember, neither is being dishonest, but both are making invalid arguments. But this is not the scenario offered in the original, which concerns somebody who does possess the mental resources to know better, but is tempted to rationalize in order to reach the more agreeable conclusion. They feel a little pressure in their head when it comes to deciding which argument to accept. If a judge behaved thusly in sentencing a friend or an enemy, would we not consider them morally deficient in their duty as a judge? There is a level of unconscious ignorance that renders an innocent entirely blameless; somebody who possesses the inner resources to have the first intimation that one hot day is a bad argument for global warming is past that level.
That said, if two unenlightened ones are arguing back and forth in all sincerity by telling each other about the hot versus cold days they remember, neither is being dishonest, but both are making invalid arguments.
Yes, that is what I was saying.
But this is not the scenario offered in the original …
The (apparent) reasoning I am challenging, Eliezer, is this: “Alice is making an invalid argument for side A” → “therefore Alice would not make an invalid argument for side B”. This seems faulty. You seem to be taking someone’s use of invalid reasoning as evidence of one-sidedness (and thus dishonesty), whereas it could just be evidence of not understanding what does and does not constitute a valid argument (but no dishonesty).
In other words, “this” (i.e., “somebody who … is tempted to rationalize in order to reach the more agreeable conclusion”) is not quite the scenario offered in the original. The scenario you offer, rather, is one where you conclude that somebody is rationalizing—but what I am saying is that your conclusion rests on a faulty inference.
This is all a minor point, of course, and does not take away from your main points. The reason I bring it up, is that I see you as imputing ill intent (or at least, blameworthy bias) to at least some people who aren’t deserving of that judgment. Avoiding this sort of thing is also important for sanity, civilization, etc.
The (apparent) reasoning I am challenging, Eliezer, is this: “Alice is making an invalid argument for side A” → “therefore Alice would not make an invalid argument for side B”. This seems faulty.
As some anecdata, I know several people who have done this precisely for global warming. I suspect Eliezer has spoken to them as well, because the standard response when you point out that they’re using the reverse of the “day of cold weather” argument they’ve derided is:
Well, it’s important to use only valid arguments… but there was a sustained pattern of record highs worldwide over multiple years which does count as evidence, and that particular very hot day was a part of that pattern, so it’s valid evidence for global warming.
Now, what I don’t know is if they actually wouldn’t reason wrongly on both sides, but have already been taught elsewhere the problem with the “day of cold weather” argument. It could still be that the problem is not malice but failure to generalise
Suppose the first person says his thing, and the second person responds with his thing. Might the first person not counter thusly:
“But maybe you shouldn’t roll your eyes at someone who offers a single very cold day as an argument that global warming is false. One person’s modus tollens is another’s modus ponens, after all.”
Where is the dishonesty in that? It seems entirely consistent, to me.
There will be a single very cold day occasionally regardless of whether global warming is true or false. Anyone who knows the phrase “modus tollens” ought to know that. That said, if two unenlightened ones are arguing back and forth in all sincerity by telling each other about the hot versus cold days they remember, neither is being dishonest, but both are making invalid arguments. But this is not the scenario offered in the original, which concerns somebody who does possess the mental resources to know better, but is tempted to rationalize in order to reach the more agreeable conclusion. They feel a little pressure in their head when it comes to deciding which argument to accept. If a judge behaved thusly in sentencing a friend or an enemy, would we not consider them morally deficient in their duty as a judge? There is a level of unconscious ignorance that renders an innocent entirely blameless; somebody who possesses the inner resources to have the first intimation that one hot day is a bad argument for global warming is past that level.
Yes, that is what I was saying.
The (apparent) reasoning I am challenging, Eliezer, is this: “Alice is making an invalid argument for side A” → “therefore Alice would not make an invalid argument for side B”. This seems faulty. You seem to be taking someone’s use of invalid reasoning as evidence of one-sidedness (and thus dishonesty), whereas it could just be evidence of not understanding what does and does not constitute a valid argument (but no dishonesty).
In other words, “this” (i.e., “somebody who … is tempted to rationalize in order to reach the more agreeable conclusion”) is not quite the scenario offered in the original. The scenario you offer, rather, is one where you conclude that somebody is rationalizing—but what I am saying is that your conclusion rests on a faulty inference.
This is all a minor point, of course, and does not take away from your main points. The reason I bring it up, is that I see you as imputing ill intent (or at least, blameworthy bias) to at least some people who aren’t deserving of that judgment. Avoiding this sort of thing is also important for sanity, civilization, etc.
As some anecdata, I know several people who have done this precisely for global warming. I suspect Eliezer has spoken to them as well, because the standard response when you point out that they’re using the reverse of the “day of cold weather” argument they’ve derided is:
Now, what I don’t know is if they actually wouldn’t reason wrongly on both sides, but have already been taught elsewhere the problem with the “day of cold weather” argument. It could still be that the problem is not malice but failure to generalise