EY 2007/2008 was mostly wrong about the brain, AI, and thus alignment in many ways.
As an example, the EY/MIRI/LW conception of AI Boxing assumes you are boxing an AI that already knows 1.) you exist, and 2.) that it is in a box. These assumptions serve pedagogical purpose for a blogger—especially one attempting to impress people with boxing experiments—but they are hardly justifiable, and if you remove those arbitrary constraints it’s obvious that perfect containment is possible in simulation sandboxes given appropriate knowledge/training constraints: simboxing is easy.
I did not downvote your comment btw. I challenge you to think for yourself and identify what exactly you disagree with.
EY 2007/2008 was mostly wrong about the brain, AI, and thus alignment in many ways.
As an example, the EY/MIRI/LW conception of AI Boxing assumes you are boxing an AI that already knows 1.) you exist, and 2.) that it is in a box. These assumptions serve pedagogical purpose for a blogger—especially one attempting to impress people with boxing experiments—but they are hardly justifiable, and if you remove those arbitrary constraints it’s obvious that perfect containment is possible in simulation sandboxes given appropriate knowledge/training constraints: simboxing is easy.
I did not downvote your comment btw. I challenge you to think for yourself and identify what exactly you disagree with.