I don’t really understand this distinction. If property dualism is to explain subjective experience at all, the word ‘me’ must refer to a bundle of phenomenological properties associated to e.g. Richard Chappell’s brain. Saying that ‘I am now Britney Spears’ would just mean that the same identifier now referred to a different bundle of phenomenal qualia. True, the physical and even mental features of the world would be unchanged, but it seems easy to model haeccetism just by adding a layer of indirection between your subjective experience and the actual bundle of qualia. And given that the possiblity of ‘waking up as someone else’ is somewhat intuitive, this might be worthwhile.
I don’t really understand this distinction. If property dualism is to explain subjective experience at all, the word ‘me’ must refer to a bundle of phenomenological properties associated to e.g. Richard Chappell’s brain. Saying that ‘I am now Britney Spears’ would just mean that the same identifier now referred to a different bundle of phenomenal qualia. True, the physical and even mental features of the world would be unchanged, but it seems easy to model haeccetism just by adding a layer of indirection between your subjective experience and the actual bundle of qualia. And given that the possiblity of ‘waking up as someone else’ is somewhat intuitive, this might be worthwhile.