After step one, you have a 50% chance of finding yourself the original; there is nothing controversial about this much.
That’s not the way my subjective anticipation works, so the assertion of uncontroversialness is premature. I anticipate that after step one I have a 100% chance of being the copy, and a 100% chance of being the original. (Which is to say, both of those individuals will remember my anticipation.)
Right, I’m getting the feeling I was too focused on the section of the audience that subscribes to the theory of subjective anticipation against which I was arguing, and forgetting about the section that already doesn’t :-)
Cyan, I gave another argument against subjective anticipation, which does cover the way your subjective anticipation works. Please take a look. (I’m replying to you here in case you miss it.)
Thanks for the link. When you write that it’s an argument against subjective anticipation, I’m not sure what you are specifically arguing against. If you’re just saying that my kind of subjective anticipation will lead to time-inconsistent decisions (and hence is irrational), I agree.
I think this guy disagrees: Weatherson, Brian. Should We Respond to Evil with Indifference? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2005): 613-35. Link: http://brian.weatherson.org/papers.shtml
I would prefer if, before I click on the link, the comment tells me something more than someone disagrees with Cyan on the internet.
Good information to include would be the nature of the disagreement (what competing claim is made) and a summary of the reasoning that backs up that competing claim.
I further note that your link points to a list of articles, none of which have the name you cited. This is not helpful.
That’s not the way my subjective anticipation works, so the assertion of uncontroversialness is premature. I anticipate that after step one I have a 100% chance of being the copy, and a 100% chance of being the original. (Which is to say, both of those individuals will remember my anticipation.)
Right, I’m getting the feeling I was too focused on the section of the audience that subscribes to the theory of subjective anticipation against which I was arguing, and forgetting about the section that already doesn’t :-)
Cyan, I gave another argument against subjective anticipation, which does cover the way your subjective anticipation works. Please take a look. (I’m replying to you here in case you miss it.)
Thanks for the link. When you write that it’s an argument against subjective anticipation, I’m not sure what you are specifically arguing against. If you’re just saying that my kind of subjective anticipation will lead to time-inconsistent decisions (and hence is irrational), I agree.
I think this guy disagrees: Weatherson, Brian. Should We Respond to Evil with Indifference? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2005): 613-35. Link: http://brian.weatherson.org/papers.shtml
I would prefer if, before I click on the link, the comment tells me something more than someone disagrees with Cyan on the internet.
Good information to include would be the nature of the disagreement (what competing claim is made) and a summary of the reasoning that backs up that competing claim.
I further note that your link points to a list of articles, none of which have the name you cited. This is not helpful.
It’s hidden in “Older Work”—you have to click on “Major Published Papers” to see it.
But agreed on all other points.