[Epistemic status & effort: exploring a question over an hour or so, and constrained to only use information I already know. This is a problem solving exercise, not a research paper. Originally written just for me; minor clarification added later.]
Is the use of force a unique industry, where a single monolithic [business] entity is the most stable state, the equilibrium point? From a business perspective, an entity selling the use of force might be thought of as in a “risk management” or “contract enforcement” industry. It might use an insurance-like business model, or function more like a contractor for large projects.
In a monopoly on the use of force, the one monopolizing entity can spend all of its time deciding what to do, and then relatively little time & energy actually exerting that force, because resistance to its force is minimal, since there are no similarly sized entities to oppose it. The cost of using force is slightly increased if the default level of resistance [i.e. how much force is available to someone who has not hired their own use-of-force business entity] is increased. Can the default level of opposition be lowered by a monolithic entity? Yes [e.g. limiting private ownership of weapons & armor].
In a diverse [non-monopoly] environment, an entity selling the use of force could easily find a similar sized entity opposing it. Opposed entities can fight immediately like hawks, or can negotiate like doves, but: the costs of conflict will be underestimated (somehow they always are); “shooting first” (per the dark forest analogy) is a powerful & possibly dominant strategy; and hawkish entities impose a cost on the entire industry.
Does this incentivize dovish entities to cooperate to eliminate hawkish entities? If they are able to coordinate, and if there are enough of them to bear the cost & survive, then probably. If they do this, then they in-effect form a single monolithic cooperating entity. If they cannot, then dovish entities may become meaningless, as hawkish entities tear them and each other apart until only one remains (Highlander rules?). Our original question might then depend on the following one:
“Do dovish entities in the market of force necessarily either become de facto monopolies or perish?”
How do we go about both answering and supporting this question? Via historical example and / or counterexample?
What does the example look like?
Entities in the same ecosystem either destroy each other, or cooperate to a degree where they cease acting like separate entities.
What does the counterexample look like?
Entities in the same ecosystem remain separate, only cooperate to serve shared goals, and do come into conflict, but do not escalate that conflict into deadly force.
[Sidenote: what is this “degree of cooperation”? Shared goal: I want to accomplish X, and you also want to accomplish X, so we cooperate to make accomplishment of X more likely. “To cease acting separately”: I want to accomplish X; you do not care about X; however, you will still help me with X, and bear costs to do so, because you value our relationship, and have the expectation that I may help you accomplish an unknown Y in the future, even though I don’t care about Y.]
Possible examples to investigate (at least the ones which come quickly to mind):
Danish conquests in medieval UK.
The world wars and cold war.
Modern geopolitics.
Possible counterexamples to investigate:
Pre-nationalized medieval European towns & cities, of the kind mentioned in Seeing Like a State?
Urban gang environments, especially in areas with minimal law enforcement?
Somalia, or other areas described as “failed states”?
Modern geopolitics.
Standoffs between federal authorities and militia groups in the modern & historical USA, such as the standoff at Bundy Ranch.
This is a good topic for investigation, but you probably need to model it in more detail than you currently are. There are many dimensions and aspects to use of violence (and the threat of violence) that don’t quite fit the “monopoly” model. And many kinds of force/coercion that aren’t directly violent, even if they’re tenuously chained to violence via many causal steps.
I very much like the recognition that it’s an equilibrium—there are multiple opposing (and semi-opposing, if viewed in multiple dimensions) actors with various strength and willingness to harm or cooperate. It’s not clear whether there’s a single solution at any given time, but it is clear that it will shift over time, sometimes quickly, often slowly.
Another good exploration is “what rights exist without being enforced by violence (or the distant threat of violence)?” I’d argue almost none.
Monopolies on the Use of Force
[Epistemic status & effort: exploring a question over an hour or so, and constrained to only use information I already know. This is a problem solving exercise, not a research paper. Originally written just for me; minor clarification added later.]
Is the use of force a unique industry, where a single monolithic [business] entity is the most stable state, the equilibrium point? From a business perspective, an entity selling the use of force might be thought of as in a “risk management” or “contract enforcement” industry. It might use an insurance-like business model, or function more like a contractor for large projects.
In a monopoly on the use of force, the one monopolizing entity can spend all of its time deciding what to do, and then relatively little time & energy actually exerting that force, because resistance to its force is minimal, since there are no similarly sized entities to oppose it. The cost of using force is slightly increased if the default level of resistance [i.e. how much force is available to someone who has not hired their own use-of-force business entity] is increased. Can the default level of opposition be lowered by a monolithic entity? Yes [e.g. limiting private ownership of weapons & armor].
In a diverse [non-monopoly] environment, an entity selling the use of force could easily find a similar sized entity opposing it. Opposed entities can fight immediately like hawks, or can negotiate like doves, but: the costs of conflict will be underestimated (somehow they always are); “shooting first” (per the dark forest analogy) is a powerful & possibly dominant strategy; and hawkish entities impose a cost on the entire industry.
Does this incentivize dovish entities to cooperate to eliminate hawkish entities? If they are able to coordinate, and if there are enough of them to bear the cost & survive, then probably. If they do this, then they in-effect form a single monolithic cooperating entity. If they cannot, then dovish entities may become meaningless, as hawkish entities tear them and each other apart until only one remains (Highlander rules?). Our original question might then depend on the following one:
“Do dovish entities in the market of force necessarily either become de facto monopolies or perish?”
How do we go about both answering and supporting this question? Via historical example and / or counterexample?
What does the example look like? Entities in the same ecosystem either destroy each other, or cooperate to a degree where they cease acting like separate entities.
What does the counterexample look like? Entities in the same ecosystem remain separate, only cooperate to serve shared goals, and do come into conflict, but do not escalate that conflict into deadly force.
[Sidenote: what is this “degree of cooperation”? Shared goal: I want to accomplish X, and you also want to accomplish X, so we cooperate to make accomplishment of X more likely. “To cease acting separately”: I want to accomplish X; you do not care about X; however, you will still help me with X, and bear costs to do so, because you value our relationship, and have the expectation that I may help you accomplish an unknown Y in the future, even though I don’t care about Y.]
Possible examples to investigate (at least the ones which come quickly to mind): Danish conquests in medieval UK. The world wars and cold war. Modern geopolitics.
Possible counterexamples to investigate: Pre-nationalized medieval European towns & cities, of the kind mentioned in Seeing Like a State? Urban gang environments, especially in areas with minimal law enforcement? Somalia, or other areas described as “failed states”? Modern geopolitics. Standoffs between federal authorities and militia groups in the modern & historical USA, such as the standoff at Bundy Ranch.
This is a good topic for investigation, but you probably need to model it in more detail than you currently are. There are many dimensions and aspects to use of violence (and the threat of violence) that don’t quite fit the “monopoly” model. And many kinds of force/coercion that aren’t directly violent, even if they’re tenuously chained to violence via many causal steps.
I very much like the recognition that it’s an equilibrium—there are multiple opposing (and semi-opposing, if viewed in multiple dimensions) actors with various strength and willingness to harm or cooperate. It’s not clear whether there’s a single solution at any given time, but it is clear that it will shift over time, sometimes quickly, often slowly.
Another good exploration is “what rights exist without being enforced by violence (or the distant threat of violence)?” I’d argue almost none.