Interesting exploration. I have some confusion, or maybe disagreement, about the classification. The first three (hedonic, felt desires, and cognitive beliefs) are distinguishable, but not necessarily distinct. They’re so interrelated that they may simply be different views of the same thing. Or they may be different focuses, but deeply influencing each other in ways that are hard to disentangle. Felt desires, for instance, seem a lot like anticipation of hedonistic states, and belief-like preferences are a recursive modeling of the other two, in oneself and others.
The last (Choices and behavior-revealed preferences) is, presumaby, a result of the other three, not a distinct kind of welfare. Interestingly, it’s the ONLY view that other people have of someone’s internal state. Especially if speech is noticed as an action, and the choice of whether and what to say is just another choice, from which we can infer a bit about internal states.
I would say experiments, introspection and consideration of cases in humans have pretty convincingly established the dissociation between the types of welfare (e.g. see my section on it, although I didn’t go into a lot of detail), but they are highly interrelated and often or even typically build on each other like you suggest.
I’d add that the fact that they sometimes dissociate seems morally important, because it makes it more ambiguous what’s best for someone if multiple types seem to matter, and there are possible beings with some types but not others.
Interesting exploration. I have some confusion, or maybe disagreement, about the classification. The first three (hedonic, felt desires, and cognitive beliefs) are distinguishable, but not necessarily distinct. They’re so interrelated that they may simply be different views of the same thing. Or they may be different focuses, but deeply influencing each other in ways that are hard to disentangle. Felt desires, for instance, seem a lot like anticipation of hedonistic states, and belief-like preferences are a recursive modeling of the other two, in oneself and others.
The last (Choices and behavior-revealed preferences) is, presumaby, a result of the other three, not a distinct kind of welfare. Interestingly, it’s the ONLY view that other people have of someone’s internal state. Especially if speech is noticed as an action, and the choice of whether and what to say is just another choice, from which we can infer a bit about internal states.
Thanks!
I would say experiments, introspection and consideration of cases in humans have pretty convincingly established the dissociation between the types of welfare (e.g. see my section on it, although I didn’t go into a lot of detail), but they are highly interrelated and often or even typically build on each other like you suggest.
I’d add that the fact that they sometimes dissociate seems morally important, because it makes it more ambiguous what’s best for someone if multiple types seem to matter, and there are possible beings with some types but not others.