I’ve had at least one or two conversations with materialists who claim that the concept of a philosophical zombie is incoherent, although I couldn’t promise you that is a majority of them.
Anyway, if both parties agree on the definition of p-zombies, then they won’t fall into the issue that this post is trying to help people avoid, of using the same word “zombie” in different ways and mistaking a linguistic dispute for something more substantial. Indeed, when trying to determine whether we are all zombies or none of us are zombies, we end up trying to determine whether consciousness is substantial or reductive—this moves the question away from zombies to consciousness itself.
Anyway, if both parties agree on the definition of p-zombies, then they won’t fall into the issue that this post is trying to help people avoid, of using the same word “zombie” in different ways and mistaking a linguistic dispute for something more substantial
Noting that there is a certain level of verbal confusion does not imply that there is nothing going on except verbal confusion.
this moves the question away from zombies to consciousness itself
As far as Chalmers is concerned, the point was always to argue about consciousness.
“Noting that there is a certain level of verbal confusion does not imply that there is nothing going on except verbal confusion”—I’m not claiming that verbal confusion is all that is going on, but I will admit that I could have been clearer about what I meant. You are correct that Chalmer’s aim was to highlight something about consciousness and for many people discussion of zombies can be a useful way of illustrating how reductive the materialist theory of consciousness is. But from a logical standpoint, it’s not really any different from the argument you’d make if you were discussing consciousness directly. So if the zombie argument is easier to grasp for you, great; otherwise you can ignore it and focus on direct discussion of consciousness instead.
I’ve had at least one or two conversations with materialists who claim that the concept of a philosophical zombie is incoherent, although I couldn’t promise you that is a majority of them.
Anyway, if both parties agree on the definition of p-zombies, then they won’t fall into the issue that this post is trying to help people avoid, of using the same word “zombie” in different ways and mistaking a linguistic dispute for something more substantial. Indeed, when trying to determine whether we are all zombies or none of us are zombies, we end up trying to determine whether consciousness is substantial or reductive—this moves the question away from zombies to consciousness itself.
Noting that there is a certain level of verbal confusion does not imply that there is nothing going on except verbal confusion.
As far as Chalmers is concerned, the point was always to argue about consciousness.
“Noting that there is a certain level of verbal confusion does not imply that there is nothing going on except verbal confusion”—I’m not claiming that verbal confusion is all that is going on, but I will admit that I could have been clearer about what I meant. You are correct that Chalmer’s aim was to highlight something about consciousness and for many people discussion of zombies can be a useful way of illustrating how reductive the materialist theory of consciousness is. But from a logical standpoint, it’s not really any different from the argument you’d make if you were discussing consciousness directly. So if the zombie argument is easier to grasp for you, great; otherwise you can ignore it and focus on direct discussion of consciousness instead.