A proposition expressed by ”a is F” has a fuzzy truth value whenever F is a vague predicate. Since vague concepts figure in most propositions, their truth values are affected as well.
When you talk about “standard Bayesian cluster models”, you talk about (Bayesian) statistics. But Richard talks about Bayesian epistemology. This doesn’t involve models, only beliefs, and beliefs are propositions combined with a degree to which they are believed. See the list with the five assumptions of Bayesian epistemology in the beginning.
A proposition expressed by ”a is F” has a fuzzy truth value whenever F is a vague predicate. Since vague concepts figure in most propositions, their truth values are affected as well.
When you talk about “standard Bayesian cluster models”, you talk about (Bayesian) statistics. But Richard talks about Bayesian epistemology. This doesn’t involve models, only beliefs, and beliefs are propositions combined with a degree to which they are believed. See the list with the five assumptions of Bayesian epistemology in the beginning.