Maybe the Law of the Minimum applies (“growth is limited by the scarcest resource”). Or something else. It doesn’t matter.
Of course it matters. These theories prescribe different remedies. If the model requires assuming that some law applies, as you suggest, or that “incrementation” is functionally additive, as EY implies, these postulates should be explicit in the model, as they’re crucial to deriving the remedy.
But as the model stands—and as it was probably intended—it exemplifies a fallacy: failure to optimize at the margin, substituting the most “important” aspect of the scenario for the result of an analysis at the margin.
A kind of law of the minimum presents a good analogy. The factors of production are classically said to be land, labor, and capital. A law of diminishing returns applies to investments in each, such that the most needy factor is the best target for investment.
Now apply this law to the problems besetting a given country. Throughout most of U.S. history, labor was the factor in greatest shortage. There was always plenty of land. Yet, the U.S. embarked on a policy of expanding to the Pacific Ocean. Although it had tons of land, acquiring more land was so much easier than acquiring labor or capital, that it dominated the course of U.S. history.
To evaluate this kind of situation, you can’t look at which factor is low based simply on relative levels when you consider where to invest—or where to apply remedial efforts—because it can look much different when you make a marginal analysis.
The framework here presented isn’t a suitable basis for a marginal analysis. You need mechanisms, not a facet analysis of motivation, to tell you where you can effectively apply your attention.
The formula’s variables, by themselves, are a priori. They are a way of classifying facts about motivation, not distinct causes in any instance of procrastination. This is pjeby’s point: at root is a reification of akrasia (or procrastination).
When you say procrastination can be broken down into these four components, this would be a useful approach if procrastination were a single thing. Defining it, per the formula, as a shortfall of motivation gives you an outcome, not its mechanism. The variables are conceptual aspects of the shortfall, not the components of any mechanism, presumably a conflict causing the shortfall.
Recently, a lot of the useful analysis of mechanisms has been done, under the paradigms of ego-depletion theory (decision fatigue) and construal-level theory. But these are ignored in the offered remedy, which applies general (long-known) principles of motivation. This is the business schools’ not-very-cutting-edge approach to applied psychology.
Of course it matters. These theories prescribe different remedies. If the model requires assuming that some law applies, as you suggest, or that “incrementation” is functionally additive, as EY implies, these postulates should be explicit in the model, as they’re crucial to deriving the remedy.
I don’t read postings like the original as asserting models, although lukeprog might disagree, and to the extent that he would, that’s the sort of thing I generally just tune out. I regard them as being more like things such as MBTI or astrological types—schemas for imputing structure to some Rohrschach blot of a phenomenon as a method of generating ideas about it. And it doesn’t matter where such ideas come from (which is what I had in mind when saying “it doesn’t matter”) if one gets practical use out of them.
Of course it matters. These theories prescribe different remedies. If the model requires assuming that some law applies, as you suggest, or that “incrementation” is functionally additive, as EY implies, these postulates should be explicit in the model, as they’re crucial to deriving the remedy.
But as the model stands—and as it was probably intended—it exemplifies a fallacy: failure to optimize at the margin, substituting the most “important” aspect of the scenario for the result of an analysis at the margin.
A kind of law of the minimum presents a good analogy. The factors of production are classically said to be land, labor, and capital. A law of diminishing returns applies to investments in each, such that the most needy factor is the best target for investment.
Now apply this law to the problems besetting a given country. Throughout most of U.S. history, labor was the factor in greatest shortage. There was always plenty of land. Yet, the U.S. embarked on a policy of expanding to the Pacific Ocean. Although it had tons of land, acquiring more land was so much easier than acquiring labor or capital, that it dominated the course of U.S. history.
To evaluate this kind of situation, you can’t look at which factor is low based simply on relative levels when you consider where to invest—or where to apply remedial efforts—because it can look much different when you make a marginal analysis.
The framework here presented isn’t a suitable basis for a marginal analysis. You need mechanisms, not a facet analysis of motivation, to tell you where you can effectively apply your attention.
The formula’s variables, by themselves, are a priori. They are a way of classifying facts about motivation, not distinct causes in any instance of procrastination. This is pjeby’s point: at root is a reification of akrasia (or procrastination).
When you say procrastination can be broken down into these four components, this would be a useful approach if procrastination were a single thing. Defining it, per the formula, as a shortfall of motivation gives you an outcome, not its mechanism. The variables are conceptual aspects of the shortfall, not the components of any mechanism, presumably a conflict causing the shortfall.
Recently, a lot of the useful analysis of mechanisms has been done, under the paradigms of ego-depletion theory (decision fatigue) and construal-level theory. But these are ignored in the offered remedy, which applies general (long-known) principles of motivation. This is the business schools’ not-very-cutting-edge approach to applied psychology.
I don’t read postings like the original as asserting models, although lukeprog might disagree, and to the extent that he would, that’s the sort of thing I generally just tune out. I regard them as being more like things such as MBTI or astrological types—schemas for imputing structure to some Rohrschach blot of a phenomenon as a method of generating ideas about it. And it doesn’t matter where such ideas come from (which is what I had in mind when saying “it doesn’t matter”) if one gets practical use out of them.