Look, the collapse of a state is the collapse of state regardless of ideological roles. (Modern Germany is fundamentally Anglo-American in design and very successful. That is the point, since you were citing the success of contemporary Germany.)
(...Nah, it would take far too long to discuss the state of Germany prior to WWI.)
Faust really was a central figure in the German idea, I’m afraid. I don’t know how consciously Goethe was complicit in this, and this has nothing to do with what he would have had problems for saying what when he published Faust.
Of course Faust is still a part of German culture. He’s part of world culture, a typically German vision of the universal man. (I am personally a huge fan of Faust.)
I don’t understand the contradiction in saying that X and Y have different wishes for the future owing to cultural differences. (And I don’t understand what Habermas’ Europe has to do with the 19th century German idea. Habermas has openly stated that the German intellectual tradition is inadequate for criticizing fascism and consciously borrowed from Anglophone thinkers. The most striking difference between thinkers who have gained a standing in the Anglophone world and thinkers from the rest of the world is their careful, deliberate anti-existentialism.)
In the 19th century the German idea was about not having wars between German states. It was about not having border but being unified under shared law. It was in it’s nature cosmopolitan.
“Deutschland, Deutschland über alles” meant when it was written to have something that’s bigger than the individual states.
The European idea is given credit for preventing European nations from waging war against each other after WWII.
Kant is commonly admitted to be a romantic philosopher
When reading Kant in a school philosophy study group, our teacher told us that discussing whether or not someone is a romantic philosopher, is an Anglo-thing.
German intellectual discourse usually doesn’t focus on putting those kinds of labels on people but tries to be more discerning.
I also think that you overrate the impact of philosophers. A lot of important thought isn’t done by philosophers.
Today the Bertelsmann Stiftung produces more ideas that are relevant for political policy than Habermas.
Oh well, I agree with the English that Kant was a romantic philosopher. Rousseau was a primary source of inspiration for him. (I agree with Dewey that writers (Goethe) and philosophers (Kant) give expression to popular views more than shaping them. OTOH, as much as I admire Goethe, I think Oswald Spengler went too far in trying to interpret him as a universal philosopher.)
“In the 19th century the German idea was about not having wars between German states,” is a true statement, but it leaves out crucial details. For example, there are many people who agree that European nations should not war against each other, but are bitterly critical of the details of how that general plan was implemented in practice.
I think it follows that the European idea is not reducible to the notion that European states should not fight. If you do not agree, then I apologize for using terms like “European idea” and “German idea” in a sense you didn’t intend, but my point can be easily reworded using “implementation of the German idea” in place of “German idea”.
The point I’m trying to make is that, like I said, Germany is currently outcompeting the Anglo-American world on the terms of the Anglo-American world, not on the original terms of Germany. Arguably, England wanted to end European wars in the 19th century as well. Who would you say got their way in the end, England or Germany?
Sir Humphrey: Minister, Britain has had the same foreign policy objective for at least the last five hundred years: to create a disunited Europe. In that cause we have fought with the Dutch against the Spanish, with the Germans against the French, with the French and Italians against the Germans, and with the French against the Germans and Italians. Divide and rule, you see. Why should we change now, when it’s worked so well?
Hacker: That’s all ancient history, surely?
Sir Humphrey: Yes, and current policy. We ‘had’ to break the whole thing [the EEC] up, so we had to get inside. We tried to break it up from the outside, but that wouldn’t work. Now that we’re inside we can make a complete pig’s breakfast of the whole thing: set the Germans against the French, the French against the Italians, the Italians against the Dutch. The Foreign Office is terribly pleased; it’s just like old times.
Hacker: But surely we’re all committed to the European ideal?
Sir Humphrey: [chuckles] Really, Minister.
Hacker: If not, why are we pushing for an increase in the membership?
Sir Humphrey: Well, for the same reason. It’s just like the United Nations, in fact; the more members it has, the more arguments it can stir up, the more futile and impotent it becomes.
Hacker: What appalling cynicism.
Sir Humphrey: Yes… We call it diplomacy, Minister.
Europe today looks a lot more unified than it was in the 19th century, so that went more towards the German strategy.
Their are issues like accounting rules where we Germans gave up our superior accounting rules under which a crisis like the one of 2008 would be less likely to happen for the sake of having international accounting standards.
On the other hand now the Bundesbank does manage to mostly set the course of European monetary policy.
Look, the collapse of a state is the collapse of state regardless of ideological roles. (Modern Germany is fundamentally Anglo-American in design and very successful. That is the point, since you were citing the success of contemporary Germany.)
(...Nah, it would take far too long to discuss the state of Germany prior to WWI.)
Faust really was a central figure in the German idea, I’m afraid. I don’t know how consciously Goethe was complicit in this, and this has nothing to do with what he would have had problems for saying what when he published Faust.
Of course Faust is still a part of German culture. He’s part of world culture, a typically German vision of the universal man. (I am personally a huge fan of Faust.)
I don’t understand the contradiction in saying that X and Y have different wishes for the future owing to cultural differences. (And I don’t understand what Habermas’ Europe has to do with the 19th century German idea. Habermas has openly stated that the German intellectual tradition is inadequate for criticizing fascism and consciously borrowed from Anglophone thinkers. The most striking difference between thinkers who have gained a standing in the Anglophone world and thinkers from the rest of the world is their careful, deliberate anti-existentialism.)
(Kant is commonly admitted to be a romantic philosopher, and I found this link: http://philosophyisnotaluxury.com/2010/08/12/romanticism-and-existential-philosophy/)
In the 19th century the German idea was about not having wars between German states. It was about not having border but being unified under shared law. It was in it’s nature cosmopolitan. “Deutschland, Deutschland über alles” meant when it was written to have something that’s bigger than the individual states.
The European idea is given credit for preventing European nations from waging war against each other after WWII.
When reading Kant in a school philosophy study group, our teacher told us that discussing whether or not someone is a romantic philosopher, is an Anglo-thing. German intellectual discourse usually doesn’t focus on putting those kinds of labels on people but tries to be more discerning.
I also think that you overrate the impact of philosophers. A lot of important thought isn’t done by philosophers. Today the Bertelsmann Stiftung produces more ideas that are relevant for political policy than Habermas.
Oh well, I agree with the English that Kant was a romantic philosopher. Rousseau was a primary source of inspiration for him. (I agree with Dewey that writers (Goethe) and philosophers (Kant) give expression to popular views more than shaping them. OTOH, as much as I admire Goethe, I think Oswald Spengler went too far in trying to interpret him as a universal philosopher.)
“In the 19th century the German idea was about not having wars between German states,” is a true statement, but it leaves out crucial details. For example, there are many people who agree that European nations should not war against each other, but are bitterly critical of the details of how that general plan was implemented in practice.
I think it follows that the European idea is not reducible to the notion that European states should not fight. If you do not agree, then I apologize for using terms like “European idea” and “German idea” in a sense you didn’t intend, but my point can be easily reworded using “implementation of the German idea” in place of “German idea”.
The point I’m trying to make is that, like I said, Germany is currently outcompeting the Anglo-American world on the terms of the Anglo-American world, not on the original terms of Germany. Arguably, England wanted to end European wars in the 19th century as well. Who would you say got their way in the end, England or Germany?
England and Germany are not words on the same category. It’s a bit apples to oranges.
Comparing England with Prussia or Britain with Germany would be a step in the right direction but it still misses the different nature.
Yes, it’s that unification is the right strategy to prevent fighting.
In the early 19th century the call was for a free, unified and democratic Germany.
The part about democracy was copying other nations. Doing something in a different way than other nation wasn’t the point.
The British geopolitical goal was to divide continental European powers.
To quote “Yes, Minister”:
Europe today looks a lot more unified than it was in the 19th century, so that went more towards the German strategy.
Their are issues like accounting rules where we Germans gave up our superior accounting rules under which a crisis like the one of 2008 would be less likely to happen for the sake of having international accounting standards. On the other hand now the Bundesbank does manage to mostly set the course of European monetary policy.