Well, to be fair, there is this bit in Consciousness Explained (which I happened to be reading just now):
Philosophers have adopted various names for the things in the beholder (or properties of the beholder) that have been supposed to provide a safe home for the colors and the rest of the properties that have been banished from the “external” world by the triumphs of physics: “raw feels,” “sensa,” “phenomenal qualities,” “intrinsic properties of conscious experiences,” “the qualitative content of mental states,” and, of course, “qualia,” the term I will use. There are subtle differences in how these terms have been defined, but I’m going to ride roughshod over them. In the previous chapter I seemed to be denying that there are any such properties, and for once what seems so is so. I am denying that there are any such properties. But (here comes that theme again) I agree wholeheartedly that there seem to be qualia.
Yes, Dennett denies that there are qualia in the sense he’s arguing against (and in this, he disagrees with many other philosophers). But does he deny that there are “individual instances of subjective, conscious experience”? Well, he denies that there are such things in fact, but not that there are such things heterophenomenologically. As I said, his position is nuanced. (See also the bit about “fatigues”.) However, on the definition I cited in the top-level comment of this thread, Dennett does not deny the existence of qualia.
Dennett’s views are nuanced, but central to them is his idea of heterophenomenology: the idea that “how things seem to me” is a perfectly real phenomenon (one which is constituted by our self-reports of how things [allegedly] seem to us, and other behavior which is apparently caused by such seemings), which it is our task (as philosophers of mind) to explain—but our explanation of which need not include anything like the entities (allegedly, apparently) experienced by the subject.
Under this view, “qualia” is taken to be a description of a certain aspect of our experiences of the world. What we do not take as given, however, is any notion that our explanation of “qualia” must ultimately include anything like qualia. (And, indeed, Dennett’s explanation does not—he spends, in fact, considerable effort on demonstrating that no sensible explanation of “qualia” will include any qualia.)
(As for the explanation itself—I really can’t do justice to it in a comment, or even a post. I do recommend Consciousness Explained, and also Brainstorms; they’re fun reading, even if you’re ultimately unconvinced by some or all of Dennett’s arguments.)
Dennett does not present himself as explaining “qualia” in any sense, not even a merely heterophenomenological sense.
Under heterophenomeonological investigation, an ordinary person will not claim to have “a red quale” or “a pain quale”. A qualiaphilic investigator might regard those as reports of qualia, but Dednnett is no qualiaphile.
I can see how there could be a Dennett-alike philosopher who objects to “thick” qualia but not thin ones. However, the Dennett we have wants to “ride roughshod”, not make fine distinctions.
This is a mischaracterization of Dennett’s views.
Well, to be fair, there is this bit in Consciousness Explained (which I happened to be reading just now):
Yes, Dennett denies that there are qualia in the sense he’s arguing against (and in this, he disagrees with many other philosophers). But does he deny that there are “individual instances of subjective, conscious experience”? Well, he denies that there are such things in fact, but not that there are such things heterophenomenologically. As I said, his position is nuanced. (See also the bit about “fatigues”.) However, on the definition I cited in the top-level comment of this thread, Dennett does not deny the existence of qualia.
How would you characterise his views then?
Dennett’s views are nuanced, but central to them is his idea of heterophenomenology: the idea that “how things seem to me” is a perfectly real phenomenon (one which is constituted by our self-reports of how things [allegedly] seem to us, and other behavior which is apparently caused by such seemings), which it is our task (as philosophers of mind) to explain—but our explanation of which need not include anything like the entities (allegedly, apparently) experienced by the subject.
Under this view, “qualia” is taken to be a description of a certain aspect of our experiences of the world. What we do not take as given, however, is any notion that our explanation of “qualia” must ultimately include anything like qualia. (And, indeed, Dennett’s explanation does not—he spends, in fact, considerable effort on demonstrating that no sensible explanation of “qualia” will include any qualia.)
(As for the explanation itself—I really can’t do justice to it in a comment, or even a post. I do recommend Consciousness Explained, and also Brainstorms; they’re fun reading, even if you’re ultimately unconvinced by some or all of Dennett’s arguments.)
Dennett does not present himself as explaining “qualia” in any sense, not even a merely heterophenomenological sense.
Under heterophenomeonological investigation, an ordinary person will not claim to have “a red quale” or “a pain quale”. A qualiaphilic investigator might regard those as reports of qualia, but Dednnett is no qualiaphile.
I can see how there could be a Dennett-alike philosopher who objects to “thick” qualia but not thin ones. However, the Dennett we have wants to “ride roughshod”, not make fine distinctions.
I beg to differ.