I’m not sure what you mean by “heuristic” or “optimality” here. I don’t know of any good notion of optimality which is independent of the other players, which is why there is an equilibrium selection problem.
I think once you settle on a “simple” welfare function, it is possible that there are _no_ Nash equilibria such that the agents are optimizing that welfare function (I don’t even really know what it means to optimize the welfare function, given that you have to also punish the opponent, which isn’t an action that is useful for the welfare function).
I’m not sure if you mean “there aren’t any theorems to be proven” or “any theorem that’s proven in this framework would be useless”.
Hmm, I meant one thing and wrote another. I meant to say “there aren’t any theorems proven in this post”.
I think once you settle on a “simple” welfare function, it is possible that there are _no_ Nash equilibria such that the agents are optimizing that welfare function (I don’t even really know what it means to optimize the welfare function, given that you have to also punish the opponent, which isn’t an action that is useful for the welfare function).
Hmm, I meant one thing and wrote another. I meant to say “there aren’t any theorems proven in this post”.