Certainly we would. But I don’t think it generally follows from “a person who causes state X should be condemned” that state X is bad. Intention matters. If someone, in attempting to lie to me, causes me to believe something true (because they were mistaken about the fact of the matter on which they lied), that doesn’t mean that believing a truth is bad, but (the attempt at) lying is still wrong/condemnable.
To put it a little differently: I’d be displeased about it if someone brainwashed me to have a new goal against my will. But I’d also be displeased about anything that anybody could do with my mind without my express invitation, even if it were something I would have expressly invited (e.g. “now raw celery tastes like sugar cane!”) My intuitions about that have to do with the invasiveness that comes of involving another agent, and not with the result. We tend to feel differently about things we do to ourselves, and things that happen to us through mindless processes, and things that are done to us on purpose by other persons. Even if those things are all alike.
I see your point and recognize that my motivational example was a bad one. If I were to try again I’d invoke something like stare decisis: it’s difficult to plan how to efficiently achieve your goals if the goals keep changing, therefore having your goals changed unexpectedly is bad.
Certainly we would. But I don’t think it generally follows from “a person who causes state X should be condemned” that state X is bad. Intention matters. If someone, in attempting to lie to me, causes me to believe something true (because they were mistaken about the fact of the matter on which they lied), that doesn’t mean that believing a truth is bad, but (the attempt at) lying is still wrong/condemnable.
No, of course it doesn’t follow generically. That was more along the lines of a motivation than a formal argument.
To put it a little differently: I’d be displeased about it if someone brainwashed me to have a new goal against my will. But I’d also be displeased about anything that anybody could do with my mind without my express invitation, even if it were something I would have expressly invited (e.g. “now raw celery tastes like sugar cane!”) My intuitions about that have to do with the invasiveness that comes of involving another agent, and not with the result. We tend to feel differently about things we do to ourselves, and things that happen to us through mindless processes, and things that are done to us on purpose by other persons. Even if those things are all alike.
I see your point and recognize that my motivational example was a bad one. If I were to try again I’d invoke something like stare decisis: it’s difficult to plan how to efficiently achieve your goals if the goals keep changing, therefore having your goals changed unexpectedly is bad.