It’s just that I personally can’t find any way to relate this isolated “qualia of redness” to anything else I care about.
Maybe not, but its still of academic interest.
The physicalist paradigm has been successful in many areas, but has yet to win out entirely because of some recalcitrant problems.
The alternatives to physicalism—idealism, dualism, panpsychism, and so on—get their traction, retain what popularity they
have, because of the mind body problem. There are a few other issues, such whether mathematical entities have an immaterial existence, and the status of physical law, but the mind-body problem is the big one. And the hard problem is the hardest part of the mind body problem.
A lot of people care enough about preserving physicalism to come up with a stance on the HP, including extreme ones like illusionism.
Maybe not, but its still of academic interest.
The physicalist paradigm has been successful in many areas, but has yet to win out entirely because of some recalcitrant problems. The alternatives to physicalism—idealism, dualism, panpsychism, and so on—get their traction, retain what popularity they have, because of the mind body problem. There are a few other issues, such whether mathematical entities have an immaterial existence, and the status of physical law, but the mind-body problem is the big one. And the hard problem is the hardest part of the mind body problem.
A lot of people care enough about preserving physicalism to come up with a stance on the HP, including extreme ones like illusionism.