If you make “physical” broad enough, it ceases to mean anything, and everything is compatible with it. That’s not a just a problem for panpsychism: physicalists are often in the position of fervently defending something they can only vaguely define. But if you try to make physicalism precise, it turns out that the concept of reductionism is the one doing the work: the idea that the only fundamental properties are physical ones, and all higher level properties must be explicable in terms of lower level ones.
if panpsychism solves everything, then it doesn’t matter whether it is physicalist or not.
Matters to whom? There’s no shortage of people who would rather leave cosnsciosuness unexplained (or illusory or non existent) than abandon physicalism.
If you make “physical” broad enough, it ceases to mean anything, and everything is compatible with it. That’s not a just a problem for panpsychism: physicalists are often in the position of fervently defending something they can only vaguely define. But if you try to make physicalism precise, it turns out that the concept of reductionism is the one doing the work: the idea that the only fundamental properties are physical ones, and all higher level properties must be explicable in terms of lower level ones.
Matters to whom? There’s no shortage of people who would rather leave cosnsciosuness unexplained (or illusory or non existent) than abandon physicalism.