Being a murderer is not a personal quality, it’s a fact about a past action.
How’s this distinction relevant here.
You say, “why would murderers subscribe to the no-murder social contract”? I reply, this is tautological: to call them murderers means they have murdered; at the time they did so, they did not follow the contract.
A better question is why would anyone subscribe to the contract (which I answered), and why would anyone choose not to subscribe, and murder someone.
So if I don’t consent to your no murder rule, it doesn’t apply to me and I can murder whoever I want?
By consensual I mean that a person only follows an ethical or moral rule if they choose to. Morality and ethics involves choices and decisions. True laws of nature or of mathematics are amoral.
I, like others, hold that it’s wrong for everyone to murder, and I act accordingly. You can decide differently and murder whoever you want: this is a fact of physics, not of morality. (Up to determinism, imperfect knowledge, etc.)
By consensual I mean that a person only follows an ethical or moral rule if they choose to.
A person also only believes in something if they choose to. Nevertheless, someone who chooses to believe that 2+2=3 is objectively wrong. Would you say the same thing about someone who chooses not to consent to the no murder rule?
2+2=3 is a statement based on explicit shared assumptions (definitions, axioms), so there’s a sense in which it’s objectively wrong independent of whoever makes it.
Not murdering is not an empirical or mathematical statement; it is a description or prescription of behavior. The only objective way to be wrong about it is to say “DanArmak doesn’t consent to the no-murder rule”; that is objectively wrong. The rule itself isn’t right or wrong any more than any other goal or value. Similarly, preferring a trip to the sea instead of climbing mountains isn’t objectively right or wrong; it can only be wrong in respect to someone’s goals, values, etc.
I don’t, and I feel I might not even understand the question or the position of those who disagree with me. There’s no way I could “believe” in such a concept; it’s not an empirical or mathematical claim which could turn out to be true. What kind of evidence would you count for or against such a concept?
Normative rules or preferences “exist” in the same way that values do. For instance, “don’t murder” is a normative preference. “Maximize the number of paperclips” is another. Neither of them has any special or privileged status of itself. No normative preference is inherently special or interesting or “true”. We’re only interested in the normative preferences we happen to hold, and hold in common with other people.
This disagreement (or possibly misunderstanding) feels like it might be a kind of joy in the merely real. I realize there are no objectively true ethics or morals, but that doesn’t mean I believe my own ethics and morals any less strongly than the average human, or that they are extremely unusual.
You say, “why would murderers subscribe to the no-murder social contract”? I reply, this is tautological: to call them murderers means they have murdered; at the time they did so, they did not follow the contract.
A better question is why would anyone subscribe to the contract (which I answered), and why would anyone choose not to subscribe, and murder someone.
By consensual I mean that a person only follows an ethical or moral rule if they choose to. Morality and ethics involves choices and decisions. True laws of nature or of mathematics are amoral.
I, like others, hold that it’s wrong for everyone to murder, and I act accordingly. You can decide differently and murder whoever you want: this is a fact of physics, not of morality. (Up to determinism, imperfect knowledge, etc.)
A person also only believes in something if they choose to. Nevertheless, someone who chooses to believe that 2+2=3 is objectively wrong. Would you say the same thing about someone who chooses not to consent to the no murder rule?
No, I wouldn’t.
2+2=3 is a statement based on explicit shared assumptions (definitions, axioms), so there’s a sense in which it’s objectively wrong independent of whoever makes it.
Not murdering is not an empirical or mathematical statement; it is a description or prescription of behavior. The only objective way to be wrong about it is to say “DanArmak doesn’t consent to the no-murder rule”; that is objectively wrong. The rule itself isn’t right or wrong any more than any other goal or value. Similarly, preferring a trip to the sea instead of climbing mountains isn’t objectively right or wrong; it can only be wrong in respect to someone’s goals, values, etc.
So you don’t believe in any concept of the normative independent of individual subjective preferences?
I don’t, and I feel I might not even understand the question or the position of those who disagree with me. There’s no way I could “believe” in such a concept; it’s not an empirical or mathematical claim which could turn out to be true. What kind of evidence would you count for or against such a concept?
Normative rules or preferences “exist” in the same way that values do. For instance, “don’t murder” is a normative preference. “Maximize the number of paperclips” is another. Neither of them has any special or privileged status of itself. No normative preference is inherently special or interesting or “true”. We’re only interested in the normative preferences we happen to hold, and hold in common with other people.
This disagreement (or possibly misunderstanding) feels like it might be a kind of joy in the merely real. I realize there are no objectively true ethics or morals, but that doesn’t mean I believe my own ethics and morals any less strongly than the average human, or that they are extremely unusual.