If Bob wouldn’t bet the house on any low probability scenario, that means Bob doesn’t assign high utility to anything (because assigning utility is just a way to encode Bob’s decisions), so the thought experiment is impossible for Bob to begin with.
This is right, and proves conclusively that all humans have bounded utility, because no human would accept any bet with e.g. 1 in Graham’s number odds of success, or if they did, it would not be for the sake of that utility, but for the sake of something else like proving to people that they have consistent principles.
“Proves conclusively” is a bit too strong. The conclusion relies on human intuitions about large numbers, and intuitions about what’s imaginable and what isn’t, both of which seem unreliable to me. I think it’s possible (>1%) that the utility function of reasonably defined CEV will be unbounded.
This is right, and proves conclusively that all humans have bounded utility, because no human would accept any bet with e.g. 1 in Graham’s number odds of success, or if they did, it would not be for the sake of that utility, but for the sake of something else like proving to people that they have consistent principles.
“Proves conclusively” is a bit too strong. The conclusion relies on human intuitions about large numbers, and intuitions about what’s imaginable and what isn’t, both of which seem unreliable to me. I think it’s possible (>1%) that the utility function of reasonably defined CEV will be unbounded.