From a decision-theory perspective, I should essentially just ignore the possibility that I’m in the first 100 rooms—right?
Similarly, if I’m born in a universe with infinite such rooms and someone tells me to guess whether my room is a multiple of 10 or not. If I guess correctly, I get a dollar; otherwise I lose a dollar.
Theoretically there are as many multiples of 10 as not (both being equinumerous to the integers), but if we define rationality as the “art of winning”, then shouldn’t I guess “not in a multiple of 10″? I admit that my intuition may be broken here—maybe it just truly doesn’t matter which you guess—after all its not like we can sample a bunch of people born into this world without some sampling function. However, doesn’t the question still remain: what would a rational being do?
From a decision-theory perspective, I should essentially just ignore the possibility that I’m in the first 100 rooms—right?
Well, what do you mean by “essentially ignore”? If you’re asking if I should assign substantial credence to the possibility, then yeah, I’d agree. If you’re asking whether I should assign literally zero credence to the possibility, so that there are no possible odds—no matter how ridiculously skewed—I would accept to bet that I am in one of those rooms… well, now I’m no longer sure. I don’t exactly know how to go about setting my credences in the world you describe, but I’m pretty sure assigning 0 probability to every single room isn’t it.
Consider this: Let’s say you’re born in this universe. A short while after you’re born, you discover a note in your room saying, “This is room number 37”. Do you believe you should update your belief set to favor the hypothesis that you’re in room 37 over any other number? If you do, it implies that your prior for the belief that you’re in one of the first 100 rooms could not have been 0.
(But. on the other hand, if you think you should update in favor of being in room x when you encounter a note saying “You are in room x”, no matter what the value of x, then you aren’t probabilistically coherent. So ultimately, I don’t think intuition-mongering is very helpful in these exotic scenarios. Consider my room 37 example as an attempt to deconstruct your initial intuition, rather than as an attempt to replace it with some other intuition.)
Theoretically there are as many multiples of 10 as not (both being equinumerous to the integers), but if we define rationality as the “art of winning”, then shouldn’t I guess “not in a multiple of 10″?
Perhaps, but reproducing this result doesn’t require that we consider every room equally likely. For instance, a distribution that attaches a probability of 2^(-n) to being in room n will also tell you to guess that you’re not in a multiple of 10. And it has the added advantage of being a possible distribution. It has the apparent disadvantage of arbitrarily privileging smaller numbered rooms, but in the kind of situation you describe, some such arbitrary privileging is unavoidable if you want your beliefs to respect the Kolmogorov axioms.
What I mean by “essentially ignore” is that if you are (for instance) offered the following bet you would probably accept: “If you are in the first 100 rooms, I kill you. Otherwise, I give you a penny.”
I see your point regarding the fact that updating using Bayes’ theorem implies your prior wasn’t 0 to begin with.
I guess my question is now whether there are any extended versions of probability theory. For instance, Kolmogorov probability reverts to Aristotelian logic for the extremes P=1 and P=0. Is there a system of though that revers to probability theory for finite worlds but is able to handle infinite worlds without privileging certain (small) numbers?
I will admit that I’m not even sure saying that guessing “not a multiple of 10” follows the art of winning, as you can’t sample from an infinite set of rooms either in traditional probability/statistics without some kind of sampling function that biases certain numbers. At best we can say that whatever finite integer N you choose as N goes to infinity the best strategy is to pick “multiple of 10″. By induction we can prove that guessing “not a multiple of 10” is true for any finite number of rooms but alas infinity remains beyond this.
From a decision-theory perspective, I should essentially just ignore the possibility that I’m in the first 100 rooms—right?
Similarly, if I’m born in a universe with infinite such rooms and someone tells me to guess whether my room is a multiple of 10 or not. If I guess correctly, I get a dollar; otherwise I lose a dollar.
Theoretically there are as many multiples of 10 as not (both being equinumerous to the integers), but if we define rationality as the “art of winning”, then shouldn’t I guess “not in a multiple of 10″? I admit that my intuition may be broken here—maybe it just truly doesn’t matter which you guess—after all its not like we can sample a bunch of people born into this world without some sampling function. However, doesn’t the question still remain: what would a rational being do?
Well, what do you mean by “essentially ignore”? If you’re asking if I should assign substantial credence to the possibility, then yeah, I’d agree. If you’re asking whether I should assign literally zero credence to the possibility, so that there are no possible odds—no matter how ridiculously skewed—I would accept to bet that I am in one of those rooms… well, now I’m no longer sure. I don’t exactly know how to go about setting my credences in the world you describe, but I’m pretty sure assigning 0 probability to every single room isn’t it.
Consider this: Let’s say you’re born in this universe. A short while after you’re born, you discover a note in your room saying, “This is room number 37”. Do you believe you should update your belief set to favor the hypothesis that you’re in room 37 over any other number? If you do, it implies that your prior for the belief that you’re in one of the first 100 rooms could not have been 0.
(But. on the other hand, if you think you should update in favor of being in room x when you encounter a note saying “You are in room x”, no matter what the value of x, then you aren’t probabilistically coherent. So ultimately, I don’t think intuition-mongering is very helpful in these exotic scenarios. Consider my room 37 example as an attempt to deconstruct your initial intuition, rather than as an attempt to replace it with some other intuition.)
Perhaps, but reproducing this result doesn’t require that we consider every room equally likely. For instance, a distribution that attaches a probability of 2^(-n) to being in room n will also tell you to guess that you’re not in a multiple of 10. And it has the added advantage of being a possible distribution. It has the apparent disadvantage of arbitrarily privileging smaller numbered rooms, but in the kind of situation you describe, some such arbitrary privileging is unavoidable if you want your beliefs to respect the Kolmogorov axioms.
What I mean by “essentially ignore” is that if you are (for instance) offered the following bet you would probably accept: “If you are in the first 100 rooms, I kill you. Otherwise, I give you a penny.”
I see your point regarding the fact that updating using Bayes’ theorem implies your prior wasn’t 0 to begin with.
I guess my question is now whether there are any extended versions of probability theory. For instance, Kolmogorov probability reverts to Aristotelian logic for the extremes P=1 and P=0. Is there a system of though that revers to probability theory for finite worlds but is able to handle infinite worlds without privileging certain (small) numbers?
I will admit that I’m not even sure saying that guessing “not a multiple of 10” follows the art of winning, as you can’t sample from an infinite set of rooms either in traditional probability/statistics without some kind of sampling function that biases certain numbers. At best we can say that whatever finite integer N you choose as N goes to infinity the best strategy is to pick “multiple of 10″. By induction we can prove that guessing “not a multiple of 10” is true for any finite number of rooms but alas infinity remains beyond this.