Are you looking for information about situations where an individual’s decisions should include predicted decisions by others (which will in turn take into account the individual’s decisions)? The (Game Theory Sequence)[http://lesswrong.com/lw/dbe/introduction_to_game_theory_sequence_guide/] is a good starting point.
Or are you looking for cases where “individual” is literally not the decision-making unit? I don’t have any good less-wrong links, but both (Public Choice Theory)[http://lesswrong.com/lw/2hv/public_choice_and_the_altruists_burden/] and the idea of sub-personal decision modules come up occasionally.
Both topics fit into the overall framework of classical decision theory (naive or not, you decide) and expected value.
Items 2-4 don’t contradict classical decision theory, but fall somewhat outside of it. decision theory generally looks at instrumental rationality—how to best get what one wants, rather than questions of what to want.
I am interested in answering questions of “what to want.” Not only is it important for individual decision-making, but there are also many interesting ethical questions. If a person’s utility function can be changed through experience, is it ethical to steer it in a direction that would benefit you? Take the example of religion: suppose you could convince an individual to convert to a religion, and then further convince them to actively reject new information that would endanger their faith. Is this ethical? (My opinion is that it depends on your own motivations. If you actually believed in the religion, then you might be convinced that you are benefiting others by converting them. If you did not actually believe in the religion, then you are being manipulative.)
I have to admit that, for myself, I remain unconvinced that there is an objective truth to be had regarding “what should I want”. Partly because I’m unconvinced that “I” is a coherent unitary thing at any given timepoint, let alone over time. And partly because I don’t see how to distinguish “preferences” from “tendencies” without resorting to unmeasurable guesses about qualia and consciousness.
Unpack #1 a bit.
Are you looking for information about situations where an individual’s decisions should include predicted decisions by others (which will in turn take into account the individual’s decisions)? The (Game Theory Sequence)[http://lesswrong.com/lw/dbe/introduction_to_game_theory_sequence_guide/] is a good starting point.
Or are you looking for cases where “individual” is literally not the decision-making unit? I don’t have any good less-wrong links, but both (Public Choice Theory)[http://lesswrong.com/lw/2hv/public_choice_and_the_altruists_burden/] and the idea of sub-personal decision modules come up occasionally.
Both topics fit into the overall framework of classical decision theory (naive or not, you decide) and expected value.
Items 2-4 don’t contradict classical decision theory, but fall somewhat outside of it. decision theory generally looks at instrumental rationality—how to best get what one wants, rather than questions of what to want.
Thanks for the references.
I am interested in answering questions of “what to want.” Not only is it important for individual decision-making, but there are also many interesting ethical questions. If a person’s utility function can be changed through experience, is it ethical to steer it in a direction that would benefit you? Take the example of religion: suppose you could convince an individual to convert to a religion, and then further convince them to actively reject new information that would endanger their faith. Is this ethical? (My opinion is that it depends on your own motivations. If you actually believed in the religion, then you might be convinced that you are benefiting others by converting them. If you did not actually believe in the religion, then you are being manipulative.)
Cool. The (Metaethics Sequence)[http://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/Metaethics_sequence] is useful for some of those things.
I have to admit that, for myself, I remain unconvinced that there is an objective truth to be had regarding “what should I want”. Partly because I’m unconvinced that “I” is a coherent unitary thing at any given timepoint, let alone over time. And partly because I don’t see how to distinguish “preferences” from “tendencies” without resorting to unmeasurable guesses about qualia and consciousness.