Rolling back to fundamentals: reducing questions about right actions to questions about likely and preferred results seems reasonable. So does treating the likely results of an action as an empirical question. So does approaching an individual’s interests empirically, and as distinct from their beliefs about their interests, assuming they have any. The latter also allows for taking into account the interests of non-sapient and non-sentient individuals, which seems like a worthwhile goal.
Extrapolating a group’s collective interests from the individual interests of its members is still unpleasantly mysterious to me, except in the fortuitous special case where individual interests happen to align neatly. Treating this as an optimization problem with multiple weighted goals is the best approach I know of, but I’m not happy with it; it has lots of problems I don’t know how to resolve.
Much to my chagrin, some method for doing this seems necessary if we are to account for individual interests in groups whose members aren’t peers (e.g., children, infants, fetuses, animals, sufferers of various impairments, minority groups, etc., etc., etc.), which seems good to address.
It’s also at least useful to addressing groups of peers whose interests don’t neatly align… though I’m more sanguine about marketplace competition as an alternative way of addressing that.
Something like this may also turn out to be critical for fully accounting for even an individual human’s interests, if it turns out that the interests of the various sub-agents of a typical human don’t align neatly, which seems plausible.
Accounting for the probable interests of probable entities (e.g., aliens) I’m even more uncertain about. I don’t discount them a priori, but without a clearer understanding of such an accounting would actually look like I really don’t know what to say about them. I guess if we have grounds for reliably estimating the probability of a particular interest being had by a particular entity, then it’s just a subset of the general weighting problem, but… I dunno.
I reject accounting for the posited interests of counterfactual entities, although I can see where the line between that and probabilistic entities as above is hard to specify.
Not really.
Rolling back to fundamentals: reducing questions about right actions to questions about likely and preferred results seems reasonable. So does treating the likely results of an action as an empirical question. So does approaching an individual’s interests empirically, and as distinct from their beliefs about their interests, assuming they have any. The latter also allows for taking into account the interests of non-sapient and non-sentient individuals, which seems like a worthwhile goal.
Extrapolating a group’s collective interests from the individual interests of its members is still unpleasantly mysterious to me, except in the fortuitous special case where individual interests happen to align neatly. Treating this as an optimization problem with multiple weighted goals is the best approach I know of, but I’m not happy with it; it has lots of problems I don’t know how to resolve.
Much to my chagrin, some method for doing this seems necessary if we are to account for individual interests in groups whose members aren’t peers (e.g., children, infants, fetuses, animals, sufferers of various impairments, minority groups, etc., etc., etc.), which seems good to address.
It’s also at least useful to addressing groups of peers whose interests don’t neatly align… though I’m more sanguine about marketplace competition as an alternative way of addressing that.
Something like this may also turn out to be critical for fully accounting for even an individual human’s interests, if it turns out that the interests of the various sub-agents of a typical human don’t align neatly, which seems plausible.
Accounting for the probable interests of probable entities (e.g., aliens) I’m even more uncertain about. I don’t discount them a priori, but without a clearer understanding of such an accounting would actually look like I really don’t know what to say about them. I guess if we have grounds for reliably estimating the probability of a particular interest being had by a particular entity, then it’s just a subset of the general weighting problem, but… I dunno.
I reject accounting for the posited interests of counterfactual entities, although I can see where the line between that and probabilistic entities as above is hard to specify.
Does that answer your question?