Some of the other questions that you refer have been disspelled in their related discussions. There seems to be some carry over confusion but I am gonig to focus on main question you are posing.
I can see a possible hole in that you mix what “your” possible expriences might be with the possibility that other view points existing. That is if other have qualia they are not your qualia. There are actuallky arguments about how a computers state can only be based on information that has physical access to it. Combined with relativity that means that indeed computers percieve time subjectively. You raised this as a lack of imagination/lack of suggestions issue. If you don’t find these claims compelling that is a separate concern of validity.
If the question of subjective observing can be rephrased as “does computation ever end?” The answer will be prettty much no, althought “human-like” computation might come to a permanent end.
Also even at the risk of being corny “What is an ocean but a multitude of drops?”. That these moments will be lost in time as “tears in the rain” doesn’t mean that they are not kickass moments.
Also if the “new” conciousness doesn’t have psychological connection why the need for time dependence? Why can’t the new the conciousness start while the old one is running? As in why would suicide have any impact for an unrelated counciousness start? If you take your viewpoint and arguments seriously you should be worried that you migth live lifes as the other you are currently interacting with. This can be potentially be more emphatethic viewpoint as in effect you live as everyone and makes altruism a form of egoism. But this risks blurring the line between you (r current incarnation) and others.
If you don’t seriously believe that you could experience later other peoples qualia and the issue is “time doesn’t work like that”, then you might be positing a strange feeler that “snaps” into different viewpoints. What is this entity like when it is not snapped to anything? Why is it still subject to strict chronology if it doesn’t have physical parts? You are mixing up a subjective time and ontological time. Your capabability to receive qualia will not have ontological inertia after your subjective time has come to an end. There is a realted question of of “terrible lives might be possible, how do we avoid them from happening?” but I am reading that you are posing a question of “how do I avoid for it to happening to me”. A terrible life will happen obvoiusly happen to the person that borns intot hat unfornate position, but for most resonable defintions it can’t be you.
Some of the other questions that you refer have been disspelled in their related discussions. There seems to be some carry over confusion but I am gonig to focus on main question you are posing.
I can see a possible hole in that you mix what “your” possible expriences might be with the possibility that other view points existing. That is if other have qualia they are not your qualia. There are actuallky arguments about how a computers state can only be based on information that has physical access to it. Combined with relativity that means that indeed computers percieve time subjectively. You raised this as a lack of imagination/lack of suggestions issue. If you don’t find these claims compelling that is a separate concern of validity.
If the question of subjective observing can be rephrased as “does computation ever end?” The answer will be prettty much no, althought “human-like” computation might come to a permanent end.
Also even at the risk of being corny “What is an ocean but a multitude of drops?”. That these moments will be lost in time as “tears in the rain” doesn’t mean that they are not kickass moments.
Also if the “new” conciousness doesn’t have psychological connection why the need for time dependence? Why can’t the new the conciousness start while the old one is running? As in why would suicide have any impact for an unrelated counciousness start? If you take your viewpoint and arguments seriously you should be worried that you migth live lifes as the other you are currently interacting with. This can be potentially be more emphatethic viewpoint as in effect you live as everyone and makes altruism a form of egoism. But this risks blurring the line between you (r current incarnation) and others.
If you don’t seriously believe that you could experience later other peoples qualia and the issue is “time doesn’t work like that”, then you might be positing a strange feeler that “snaps” into different viewpoints. What is this entity like when it is not snapped to anything? Why is it still subject to strict chronology if it doesn’t have physical parts? You are mixing up a subjective time and ontological time. Your capabability to receive qualia will not have ontological inertia after your subjective time has come to an end. There is a realted question of of “terrible lives might be possible, how do we avoid them from happening?” but I am reading that you are posing a question of “how do I avoid for it to happening to me”. A terrible life will happen obvoiusly happen to the person that borns intot hat unfornate position, but for most resonable defintions it can’t be you.