I’m not sure Bayes’ Rule dictates anything beyond its plain mathematical content, which isn’t terribly controversial:
P(A|B)=P(B|A)⋅P(A)P(B)
When people speak of Bayesian inference, they are talking about a mode of reasoning that uses Bayes’ Rule a lot, but it’s mainly motivated by a different “ontology” of probability.
As to whether Bayesian inference and Popperian falsificationism are in conflict—I’d imagine that depends very much on the subject of investigation (does it involve a need to make immediate decisions based on limited information?) and the temperaments of the human beings trying to reach a consensus.
Hm. I don’t think people who talk about “Bayesianism” in the broad sense are using a different ontology of probability than most people. I think what makes “Bayesians” different is their willingness to use probability at all, rather than some other conception of knowledge.
Like, consider the weird world of the “justified true belief” definition of knowledge and the mountains of philosophers trying to patch up its leaks. Or the FDA’s stance on whether covid vaccines work in children. It’s not that these people would deny the proof of Bayes’ theorem—it’s just that they wouldn’t think to apply it here, because they aren’t thinking of the status of some claim as being a probability.
Like, consider the weird world of the “justified true belief” definition of knowledge and the mountains of philosophers trying to patch up its leaks.
What were the major problems with JTB before Gettier? There were problems with equating knowledge with certainty...but then pretty much everyone moved to fallibilism. Without abandoning JTB. So JTB and probablism, broadly defined, aren’t incompatible. There’s nothing about justification, or truth or belief that cant come in degrees. And regarding all three of them as non-binary is a richer model than just regarding belief as non-binary.
I’m not really sure about the history. A quick search turns up Russell making similar arguments at the turn of the century, but I doubt there was the sort of boom there was after Gettier—maybe because probability wasn’t developed enough to serve as an alternative ontology.
“Classic flavor” JTB is indeed that bad. JTB shifted to a probabilistic ontology is either Bayesian, wrong, or answering a different question altogether.
I’ll go for answering different questions. Bayes, although well known to mainstream academia , isn’t regarded as the one epistemology to rule them all , precisely because there are so many issues it doesn’t address.
I’m not sure Bayes’ Rule dictates anything beyond its plain mathematical content, which isn’t terribly controversial:
P(A|B)=P(B|A)⋅P(A)P(B)
When people speak of Bayesian inference, they are talking about a mode of reasoning that uses Bayes’ Rule a lot, but it’s mainly motivated by a different “ontology” of probability.
As to whether Bayesian inference and Popperian falsificationism are in conflict—I’d imagine that depends very much on the subject of investigation (does it involve a need to make immediate decisions based on limited information?) and the temperaments of the human beings trying to reach a consensus.
Hm. I don’t think people who talk about “Bayesianism” in the broad sense are using a different ontology of probability than most people. I think what makes “Bayesians” different is their willingness to use probability at all, rather than some other conception of knowledge.
Like, consider the weird world of the “justified true belief” definition of knowledge and the mountains of philosophers trying to patch up its leaks. Or the FDA’s stance on whether covid vaccines work in children. It’s not that these people would deny the proof of Bayes’ theorem—it’s just that they wouldn’t think to apply it here, because they aren’t thinking of the status of some claim as being a probability.
What were the major problems with JTB before Gettier? There were problems with equating knowledge with certainty...but then pretty much everyone moved to fallibilism. Without abandoning JTB. So JTB and probablism, broadly defined, aren’t incompatible. There’s nothing about justification, or truth or belief that cant come in degrees. And regarding all three of them as non-binary is a richer model than just regarding belief as non-binary.
I’m not really sure about the history. A quick search turns up Russell making similar arguments at the turn of the century, but I doubt there was the sort of boom there was after Gettier—maybe because probability wasn’t developed enough to serve as an alternative ontology.
It remains the case that JTB isn’t that bad, and Bayes isn’t that good a substitute.
“Classic flavor” JTB is indeed that bad. JTB shifted to a probabilistic ontology is either Bayesian, wrong, or answering a different question altogether.
I’ll go for answering different questions. Bayes, although well known to mainstream academia , isn’t regarded as the one epistemology to rule them all , precisely because there are so many issues it doesn’t address.