I haven’t read Age of Em, but something like “spur safes” was an inspiration (I’m sure I’ve come across the idea before). My version is similar except that
It’s stripped down.
B only needs to make a Validator, which could be a copy of themself, but doesn’t have to be.
It only validates A to B, rather than trying to do both simultaneously. You can of course just run it twice in both directions.
You don’t need a trusted computing environment.
I think that’s a pretty big deal, because the trusted computing environment has to be trusted enough to run its end of A/B’s secure channels. In order for A/B to trust the output, it would need to e.g. be signed by their private keys, but then the computing envionment has access to those keys and can do whatever it wants! The trick with FHE is to let B run a computation using their secret key “inside” the safe without letting anyone else see the key.
I haven’t read Age of Em, but something like “spur safes” was an inspiration (I’m sure I’ve come across the idea before). My version is similar except that
It’s stripped down.
B only needs to make a Validator, which could be a copy of themself, but doesn’t have to be.
It only validates A to B, rather than trying to do both simultaneously. You can of course just run it twice in both directions.
You don’t need a trusted computing environment.
I think that’s a pretty big deal, because the trusted computing environment has to be trusted enough to run its end of A/B’s secure channels. In order for A/B to trust the output, it would need to e.g. be signed by their private keys, but then the computing envionment has access to those keys and can do whatever it wants! The trick with FHE is to let B run a computation using their secret key “inside” the safe without letting anyone else see the key.