“But that model that doesn’t explain the Peak-end rule very well—how is it that a certain experience is worse while experienced, but better when remembered?”
Anchoring bias. Forgetting. Contemplation of past events in a broader context. Rewriting memories. All these things happen.
“And how would self-talk be effective (and it is) if the self were indivisible—whom would you be trying to convince?”
That’s a good point. Although, I already think that the brain is modular, and it could be very possible for different parts of your brain to be experiencing different things, the biggest problem is the point at which one self ends and another begins. You explain this a little bit in the next paragraph, which makes it seem like you basically agree with me, although it seems very vaguely defined. Even if they’re like a baseball team, trading modules ocassionally, there’s a lot of vagueness that seems not to form many expectations given specifics, so experimentation would be very hard.
How many selves are there? Do they vary with time? Is there really any reason to suspect there’s only two? Is the peak end rule the best evidence for how they’re divided? What are the expectations based of of this? What experiments are being done?
I agree there isn’t a sensible utility function for individual humans. I think as far as that goes, they must be on the right track. I just wish there was more evidence, and more expectations we could derive from the model.
Anchoring bias. Forgetting. Contemplation of past events in a broader context. Rewriting memories. All these things happen.
That’s a good point. Although, I already think that the brain is modular, and it could be very possible for different parts of your brain to be experiencing different things, the biggest problem is the point at which one self ends and another begins. You explain this a little bit in the next paragraph, which makes it seem like you basically agree with me, although it seems very vaguely defined. Even if they’re like a baseball team, trading modules ocassionally, there’s a lot of vagueness that seems not to form many expectations given specifics, so experimentation would be very hard.
How many selves are there? Do they vary with time? Is there really any reason to suspect there’s only two? Is the peak end rule the best evidence for how they’re divided? What are the expectations based of of this? What experiments are being done?
I agree there isn’t a sensible utility function for individual humans. I think as far as that goes, they must be on the right track. I just wish there was more evidence, and more expectations we could derive from the model.