My actual answer is “because it starts with the word ‘only’.”
Statements that assert that something is only true of subset X, or true of every member of group Y, or other similar universals/absolutes, are almost never true either in literal specific or in “spirit,” and so in my estimation they bear the burden of proof, and should be considered suspect until demonstrated reasonable.
I have other, more complicated thoughts about why humans who are not explicitly targeting social status are nevertheless affected by and vulnerable to large changes in the status dynamic. But the above seems to be sufficient to start with.
I can of course define ‘population vying for social status’ narrowly enough that ‘Only’ applies in every literal instance. And you can of course define it broadly it enough that it never applies even ‘in spirit’.
So to go any further would seem to be splitting hairs, to be honest.
Personally, I rather not spend the time to write a long explanation when there are a boundless number of potentially valid rejoinders, due to the nature of drawing lines in the sand.
EDIT: Perhaps that is also an error of form, and/or style, on my part, but I also rather not turn short sentences into long paragraphs.
The more interesting point is in your latter paragraph,
humans who are not explicitly targeting social status are nevertheless affected by and vulnerable to large changes in the status dynamic
Yes, that seems to be a common sentiment among many, and it matches my observations as well, given a sufficiently high threshold of ‘large changes’ (of course we may disagree as to where that threshold is and it would become a drawing lines in the sand problem too.)
Sorry, I think this is an important point, and not trivial/irrelevant splitting hairs:
I can of course define ‘population vying for social status’ narrowly enough that ‘Only’ applies in every literal instance.
I do not believe this is the case, while continuing to use words in ways that resemble the way other people use those words.
In other words, “vying” is a phrase with meaning. It means something about intention, it means something about prioritization, it means something about the core target or purpose of someone’s actions. It’s true that one can set up a local, idiosyncratic meaning of a phrase that means anything, but I think it is false that there’s anything which is [true] which also, say, 70+ people out of a randomly polled 100 would agree means “only among the population vying for social status.”
Words have meaning. Their meaning is a distribution rather than a crisply defined single point, but there is in fact an objectively evaluable thing around “does X mean Y, in practice?”
And from that perspective—from the perspective of “words approximately mean what a supermajority of people interpret them to mean”—it’s importantly false that the middle ground is evaporating in a way that substantially negatively impacts people [only among the population vying for social status].
It seems from the rest of your comment that you already agree with this, so my belaboring the point may be extraneous from your perspective. But that’s a line I want to reinforce on LessWrong—I don’t want people on LessWrong to cavalierly say false things. I want to protect the sense in which words convey actual meaning, and I don’t want “that’s false” to be answered with “well, we could split hairs, but whatever.”
Duncan you haven’t actually refuted my point, but write as if you had in the latter paragraphs… Take for example,
It’s true that one can set up a local, idiosyncratic meaning of a phrase that means anything, but I think it is false that there’s anything which is [true] which also, say, 70+ people out of a randomly polled 100 would agree means “only among the population vying for social status.”
Okay, maybe it is false that 70+ out of 100 would share the meaning of my original statement, we obviously will not figure out the exact threshold without spending far more effort.
But I’m okay with utilizing definitions only 69 out of 100 would share. The exact proportion doesn’t really matter much to me, whether 69, or 70, or more, or less, out of 100. That’s my point, there are a boundless number of potentially valid arguments for and against drawing the cutoff somewhere along that spectrum. For never drawing lines, for always drawing lines, for a mixed strategy, etc.
EDIT: To be clear there are probably many folks on LW with somewhat higher or lower cutoffs, many who’ve never considered this at all, many who decide not to think in terms of a true/false binary, and so on. And if you trawl through the archives you can see many examples.
You write as if I had invented completely different meanings that 0 out of 100 would share.
So it’s only potentially false according to your ironically idiosyncratic requirement that 70+ out of 100 is the cutoff for being ‘true’.
If you’ve thought about it enough to realize it’s a continuous spectrum in practice versus a theoretical binary, like many other phenomena, then reflect on why you then try to defend an arbitrary cutoff, perhaps it is related to the topic of social status, testing boundaries, or other ideas covered in the op.
Why do you think it isn’t a reasonable prior?
My actual answer is “because it starts with the word ‘only’.”
Statements that assert that something is only true of subset X, or true of every member of group Y, or other similar universals/absolutes, are almost never true either in literal specific or in “spirit,” and so in my estimation they bear the burden of proof, and should be considered suspect until demonstrated reasonable.
I have other, more complicated thoughts about why humans who are not explicitly targeting social status are nevertheless affected by and vulnerable to large changes in the status dynamic. But the above seems to be sufficient to start with.
I can of course define ‘population vying for social status’ narrowly enough that ‘Only’ applies in every literal instance. And you can of course define it broadly it enough that it never applies even ‘in spirit’.
So to go any further would seem to be splitting hairs, to be honest.
Personally, I rather not spend the time to write a long explanation when there are a boundless number of potentially valid rejoinders, due to the nature of drawing lines in the sand.
EDIT: Perhaps that is also an error of form, and/or style, on my part, but I also rather not turn short sentences into long paragraphs.
The more interesting point is in your latter paragraph,
Yes, that seems to be a common sentiment among many, and it matches my observations as well, given a sufficiently high threshold of ‘large changes’ (of course we may disagree as to where that threshold is and it would become a drawing lines in the sand problem too.)
Can you elaborate?
Sorry, I think this is an important point, and not trivial/irrelevant splitting hairs:
I do not believe this is the case, while continuing to use words in ways that resemble the way other people use those words.
In other words, “vying” is a phrase with meaning. It means something about intention, it means something about prioritization, it means something about the core target or purpose of someone’s actions. It’s true that one can set up a local, idiosyncratic meaning of a phrase that means anything, but I think it is false that there’s anything which is [true] which also, say, 70+ people out of a randomly polled 100 would agree means “only among the population vying for social status.”
Words have meaning. Their meaning is a distribution rather than a crisply defined single point, but there is in fact an objectively evaluable thing around “does X mean Y, in practice?”
And from that perspective—from the perspective of “words approximately mean what a supermajority of people interpret them to mean”—it’s importantly false that the middle ground is evaporating in a way that substantially negatively impacts people [only among the population vying for social status].
It seems from the rest of your comment that you already agree with this, so my belaboring the point may be extraneous from your perspective. But that’s a line I want to reinforce on LessWrong—I don’t want people on LessWrong to cavalierly say false things. I want to protect the sense in which words convey actual meaning, and I don’t want “that’s false” to be answered with “well, we could split hairs, but whatever.”
Duncan you haven’t actually refuted my point, but write as if you had in the latter paragraphs… Take for example,
Okay, maybe it is false that 70+ out of 100 would share the meaning of my original statement, we obviously will not figure out the exact threshold without spending far more effort.
But I’m okay with utilizing definitions only 69 out of 100 would share. The exact proportion doesn’t really matter much to me, whether 69, or 70, or more, or less, out of 100. That’s my point, there are a boundless number of potentially valid arguments for and against drawing the cutoff somewhere along that spectrum. For never drawing lines, for always drawing lines, for a mixed strategy, etc.
EDIT: To be clear there are probably many folks on LW with somewhat higher or lower cutoffs, many who’ve never considered this at all, many who decide not to think in terms of a true/false binary, and so on. And if you trawl through the archives you can see many examples.
You write as if I had invented completely different meanings that 0 out of 100 would share.
So it’s only potentially false according to your ironically idiosyncratic requirement that 70+ out of 100 is the cutoff for being ‘true’.
If you’ve thought about it enough to realize it’s a continuous spectrum in practice versus a theoretical binary, like many other phenomena, then reflect on why you then try to defend an arbitrary cutoff, perhaps it is related to the topic of social status, testing boundaries, or other ideas covered in the op.