Jaynes definitely believed in 0 and 1 probabilities.
I did not say that he didn’t. I said that he didn’t like Kolmogorov’s axioms. You can also derive Bayes’ rule from Kolmogorov’s axioms; that doesn’t mean Jayes didn’t believe in Bayes’ rule.
I meant that he didn’t think they were the best way to describe probability. IIRC, he thought that they didn’t make it clear why the structure they described is the right way to handle uncertainty. He also may have said that they allow you to talk about certain objects that don’t really correspond to any epistemological concepts. You can find his criticism in one of the appendices to Probability Theory: the Logic of Science.
I did not say that he didn’t. I said that he didn’t like Kolmogorov’s axioms. You can also derive Bayes’ rule from Kolmogorov’s axioms; that doesn’t mean Jayes didn’t believe in Bayes’ rule.
I don’t know what one thing it means to not like axioms. So I’m not sure what you mean.
I meant that he didn’t think they were the best way to describe probability. IIRC, he thought that they didn’t make it clear why the structure they described is the right way to handle uncertainty. He also may have said that they allow you to talk about certain objects that don’t really correspond to any epistemological concepts. You can find his criticism in one of the appendices to Probability Theory: the Logic of Science.