How is Searle’s actual response to the accusation that he has just dressed up the Other Minds Problem at all satisfactory? Does anyone find it convincing?
This objection really is only worth a short reply. The problem in this discussion is not about how I know that other people have cognitive states, but rather what it is that I am attributing to them when I attribute cognitive states to them. The thrust of the argument is that it couldn’t be just computational processes and their output because the computational processes and their output can exist without the cognitive state.
Talk about begging the question...
[1] Searle, John. 1980a. “Minds, Brains, and Programs.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, 417-424.
How is Searle’s actual response to the accusation that he has just dressed up the Other Minds Problem at all satisfactory? Does anyone find it convincing?
Those who already agreed with his conclusion, much as with p-zombies.
That part of his argument is, in my opinion, the weakest part of his thesis.
Searle’s response[1] :
Talk about begging the question...
[1] Searle, John. 1980a. “Minds, Brains, and Programs.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, 417-424.