Yes, but then it sounds like those who have no such altruistic desire are equally justified as those who do. An alternative view of obligation, one which works very well with utilitarianism, is to reject personal identity as a psychological illusion. In that case there is no special difference between “my” suffering and “your” suffering, and my desire to minimize one of these rationally requires me to minimize the other. Many pantheists take such a view of ethics, and I believe its quasi-official name is “open individualism”.
I think this requires an assumption that there exists on obligation to end our own suffering; I find that a curious notion, because it presupposes that there is only one valid way to exist.
You would prefer that we had the ethical intuitions and views of the first human beings, or perhaps of their hominid ancestors?
What bearing do their ethical intuitions have on me?
(What bearing do my ethical intuitions have on future hominids?)
I think this requires an assumption that there exists on obligation to end our own suffering
The obligation in this theory is conditional on you wanting to end your own suffering. If you don’t care about your own suffering, then you have no reason to care about the suffering of others. However, if you do care, then you must also care about the suffering of others.
Yes.
I think this requires an assumption that there exists on obligation to end our own suffering; I find that a curious notion, because it presupposes that there is only one valid way to exist.
What bearing do their ethical intuitions have on me?
(What bearing do my ethical intuitions have on future hominids?)
The obligation in this theory is conditional on you wanting to end your own suffering. If you don’t care about your own suffering, then you have no reason to care about the suffering of others. However, if you do care, then you must also care about the suffering of others.