I agree with much of Glymour’s manifesto, but I think the passage quoted would have been better left on the cutting-room floor. One reason is given in the critique you link: lots of philosophy gets grants and citations and employment in diverse areas around the academy and elsewhere. Not all of it gets noticed in science or furthers a scientific project, even broadly construed. For example, John Hawthorne just won a multi-million dollar grant to do work in epistemology of religion, and a couple of years ago, Alfred Mele won a multi-million dollar grant to do more work on free will. I doubt that Glymour thinks either of these projects has the virtues of the work of his CMU colleagues. But by the “grant-winning” standard, administrators should love this sort of philosophy. By a sales or readership standard, administrators ought to be encouraging more pop-culture and philosophy schlock.
Another reason is given by Glymour in the same manifesto:
A real use of philosophy departments is to provide shelter for such thinkers [who are, at least initially, outsiders to the science of the day, people who will take up questions that may have been made invisible to scientists because of disciplinary blinkers], and in the long run they may be the salvation of philosophy as an academic discipline.
So, a good use for philosophy departments is to shelter iconoclastic thinkers who are not going to be either understood or appreciated by contemporary scientists. How are such people going to be successful grant-winners? I can see how they might successfully publish within philosophy, given a certain let-every-flower-bloom attitude in philosophy. And I can see how some philosophers might end up convincing some scientists to take their work seriously enough to fund it … eventually. But surely, some of Glymour’s iconoclasts will be missed or ignored in the grant-giving process. Better, I think, to have some places for people to think whatever they want to think and be supported in that thinking so that they do not have to panic about meeting the basic necessities of life. If that means having to put up with literary criticism, then so be it.
Disclosures. I did my dissertation under Peter Spirtes, and I’ve taken many enjoyable classes with Clark Glymour. I think Clark is an excellent person, and he is one of my philosophical heroes, although I don’t think I do a very good job of emulating him.
Full disclosures below. *
I agree with much of Glymour’s manifesto, but I think the passage quoted would have been better left on the cutting-room floor. One reason is given in the critique you link: lots of philosophy gets grants and citations and employment in diverse areas around the academy and elsewhere. Not all of it gets noticed in science or furthers a scientific project, even broadly construed. For example, John Hawthorne just won a multi-million dollar grant to do work in epistemology of religion, and a couple of years ago, Alfred Mele won a multi-million dollar grant to do more work on free will. I doubt that Glymour thinks either of these projects has the virtues of the work of his CMU colleagues. But by the “grant-winning” standard, administrators should love this sort of philosophy. By a sales or readership standard, administrators ought to be encouraging more pop-culture and philosophy schlock.
Another reason is given by Glymour in the same manifesto:
So, a good use for philosophy departments is to shelter iconoclastic thinkers who are not going to be either understood or appreciated by contemporary scientists. How are such people going to be successful grant-winners? I can see how they might successfully publish within philosophy, given a certain let-every-flower-bloom attitude in philosophy. And I can see how some philosophers might end up convincing some scientists to take their work seriously enough to fund it … eventually. But surely, some of Glymour’s iconoclasts will be missed or ignored in the grant-giving process. Better, I think, to have some places for people to think whatever they want to think and be supported in that thinking so that they do not have to panic about meeting the basic necessities of life. If that means having to put up with literary criticism, then so be it.
Disclosures. I did my dissertation under Peter Spirtes, and I’ve taken many enjoyable classes with Clark Glymour. I think Clark is an excellent person, and he is one of my philosophical heroes, although I don’t think I do a very good job of emulating him.