I can’t answer the question without knowing what your question is, and I can’t do that without knowing what the problem is.
So you don’t know what you mean when you wrote “he”?
But he describes what would constitute true understanding.
As something fairly unobtainable, which makes it sound like he is arguing against reductionism.
(Also, the problem is less Philosophically Deep than it sounds. How do things that aren’t tables come together to make tables?)
It’s philosophically shallow where we actually have reductions, as in the table case. SInce we don’t have reductions of everything, there is still a deep
problem of whether we can have reductions of everything, whether we should, whether it matters , and so on.
Induction might resolve this.
How? By arguing that we have enough reductions to prove reducability as a universal law?
So you don’t know what you mean when you wrote “he”?
Oh, you meant the question of “who is meant by he.” Sorry. I meant Cooper.
As something fairly unobtainable, which makes it sound like he is arguing against reductionism.
If the truth is hard to find, that does not make it not-the-truth. We may approximate truth by falsehoods, but neither does that make the falsehoods true. They are simply useful lies that work more efficiently in limited contexts.
In practice, you do not predict what somebody will do by simulating them down to the quark. You think about their personality, their emotions and thoughts. But if you knew somebody down to their quarks, and had unlimited computational power, then you would not be able to make any better predictions by adding a psychological model to this physics simulation. You would not have to add one—as long as you can interpret the quarks (ferex, a camera/viewpoint in a computer model) then you will get the psychology out of the physics.
It’s philosophically shallow where we actually have reductions, as in the table case. SInce we don’t have reductions of everything, there is still a deep problem of whether we can have reductions of everything, whether we should, whether it matters , and so on.
Hm. I see your point, and I agree. I don’t think that there’s any reason to suspect any particular phenomenon to be irreducible, though, and there’s certainly nothing that we know at this time to be irreducible. Reductionism has succeeded for simple things and has had partial success on more complicated things.
Also, what would it mean for a phenomenon to be irreducible? And is it even possible to understand something without reducing it? I suppose that depends on the definition of “understand”—classical vs romantic, etc.
How? By arguing that we have enough reductions to prove reducability as a universal law?
It can solve it for practical use. You can never truly prove something with induction (the non-mathematical form), since some possible worlds have long strings that seem to follow one rule then terminate according to a more fundamental rule. Only mathematical/logical truths can be proved even in principle (and even then, our minds can still make errors).
I am not certain whether reductionism is a physical law or a logical statement. It seems obvious to me that the nature of things is in their form, the way they are put together, and not their essence. But even if this is true, is the truth necessary or contingent?
If the truth is hard to find, that does not make it not-the-truth. W
If the truth is hard to find, maybe that’s because it isn’t there. Is there anything that could refute reductionism as a universal truth?
But if you knew somebody down to their quarks, and had unlimited computational power, then you would not be able to make any better predictions by adding a psychological model to this physics simulation.
Assuming reductionism.
Also, what would it mean for a phenomenon to be irreducible?
What does it mean for phenomena to be reducible? If you can’t get any predictions out of “reductionism is false”, does it even have any content. (Well, I’d get “some attempts at reductive explanation will fail”.
It can solve it for practical use.
Reductionism is hardly ever practical, as you have noted. In practice, we cannot deal with things at the quark level.
I am not certain whether reductionism is a physical law or a logical statement.
A number of people are trying to take it as both … as something that cannot be wrong, and something that says something about the universe. That’s a problem.
So you don’t know what you mean when you wrote “he”?
As something fairly unobtainable, which makes it sound like he is arguing against reductionism.
It’s philosophically shallow where we actually have reductions, as in the table case. SInce we don’t have reductions of everything, there is still a deep problem of whether we can have reductions of everything, whether we should, whether it matters , and so on.
How? By arguing that we have enough reductions to prove reducability as a universal law?
Oh, you meant the question of “who is meant by he.” Sorry. I meant Cooper.
If the truth is hard to find, that does not make it not-the-truth. We may approximate truth by falsehoods, but neither does that make the falsehoods true. They are simply useful lies that work more efficiently in limited contexts.
In practice, you do not predict what somebody will do by simulating them down to the quark. You think about their personality, their emotions and thoughts. But if you knew somebody down to their quarks, and had unlimited computational power, then you would not be able to make any better predictions by adding a psychological model to this physics simulation. You would not have to add one—as long as you can interpret the quarks (ferex, a camera/viewpoint in a computer model) then you will get the psychology out of the physics.
Hm. I see your point, and I agree. I don’t think that there’s any reason to suspect any particular phenomenon to be irreducible, though, and there’s certainly nothing that we know at this time to be irreducible. Reductionism has succeeded for simple things and has had partial success on more complicated things.
Also, what would it mean for a phenomenon to be irreducible? And is it even possible to understand something without reducing it? I suppose that depends on the definition of “understand”—classical vs romantic, etc.
It can solve it for practical use. You can never truly prove something with induction (the non-mathematical form), since some possible worlds have long strings that seem to follow one rule then terminate according to a more fundamental rule. Only mathematical/logical truths can be proved even in principle (and even then, our minds can still make errors).
I am not certain whether reductionism is a physical law or a logical statement. It seems obvious to me that the nature of things is in their form, the way they are put together, and not their essence. But even if this is true, is the truth necessary or contingent?
If the truth is hard to find, maybe that’s because it isn’t there. Is there anything that could refute reductionism as a universal truth?
Assuming reductionism.
What does it mean for phenomena to be reducible? If you can’t get any predictions out of “reductionism is false”, does it even have any content. (Well, I’d get “some attempts at reductive explanation will fail”.
Reductionism is hardly ever practical, as you have noted. In practice, we cannot deal with things at the quark level.
A number of people are trying to take it as both … as something that cannot be wrong, and something that says something about the universe. That’s a problem.