I don’t think you’re talking about my sort of view* when you say “morality-as-preference”, but:
Why do people seem to mean different things by “I want the pie” and “It is right that I should get the pie”? Why are the two propositions argued in different ways?
A commitment to drive a hard bargain makes it more costly for other people to try to get you to agree to something else. Obviously an even division is a Schelling point as well (which makes a commitment to it more credible than a commitment to an arbitrary division).
When and why do people change their terminal values? Do the concepts of “moral error” and “moral progress” have referents? Why would anyone want to change what they want?
I think humans tend not to have very clean divisions between instrumental and terminal values. Although there is no absolute moral progress or error, some moralities may be better or worse than others by almost any moral standard a human would be likely to use. Through moral hypocrisy, humans can signal loyalty to group values while disobeying them. Since humans don’t self modify easily, a genuine desire to want to change may be a cost-effective way to improve the effectiveness of this strategy.
Why and how does anyone ever “do something they know they shouldn’t”, or “want something they know is wrong”? Does the notion of morality-as-preference really add up to moral normality?
See above on signaling and hypocrisy.
*moral nihilist with instrumental view of morality as tool for coordinating behaviour.
I don’t think you’re talking about my sort of view* when you say “morality-as-preference”, but:
Why do people seem to mean different things by “I want the pie” and “It is right that I should get the pie”? Why are the two propositions argued in different ways?
A commitment to drive a hard bargain makes it more costly for other people to try to get you to agree to something else. Obviously an even division is a Schelling point as well (which makes a commitment to it more credible than a commitment to an arbitrary division).
When and why do people change their terminal values? Do the concepts of “moral error” and “moral progress” have referents? Why would anyone want to change what they want?
I think humans tend not to have very clean divisions between instrumental and terminal values. Although there is no absolute moral progress or error, some moralities may be better or worse than others by almost any moral standard a human would be likely to use. Through moral hypocrisy, humans can signal loyalty to group values while disobeying them. Since humans don’t self modify easily, a genuine desire to want to change may be a cost-effective way to improve the effectiveness of this strategy.
Why and how does anyone ever “do something they know they shouldn’t”, or “want something they know is wrong”? Does the notion of morality-as-preference really add up to moral normality?
See above on signaling and hypocrisy.
*moral nihilist with instrumental view of morality as tool for coordinating behaviour.