Why do people seem to mean different things by “I want the pie” and “It is right that I should get the pie”? Why are the two propositions argued in different ways?
I want to consider this question carefully.
My first answer is that arguing about morality is a political maneuver that is more likely to work for getting what you want than simply declaring your desires.
But that begs the question, why is it more likely to work? Why are other people, or non-sociopaths, swayed by moral arguments?
It seems like they, or their genes, must get something out of being swayed by moral arguments.
You might think that it is better coordination or something. But I don’t think that adds up. If everyone makes moral arguments insincerely, then the moral argument don’t actually add more coordination.
But remember that morality is enforced...?
Ok. Maybe the deal is that humans are loss averse. And they can project, in any given conflict, being in the weaker party’s shoes, and generalize the situation to other situations that they might be in. And so, any given onlooker would prefer norms that don’t hurt the looser too badly? And so, they would opt into a timeless contract where they would uphold a standard of “fairness”?
But also the contract is enforced.
I think this can maybe be said more simply? People have a sense rage at someone taking advantage of someone else iff they can project that they could be in the loser’s position?
And this makes sense if the “taking advantage” is likely to generalize. If the jerk is pretty likely to take advantage of you, then it might be adaptive to oppose the jerk in general?
For one thing, if you oppose the jerk when he bullies someone else, then that someone else is more likely to oppose him when he is bullying you.
Or maybe this can be even more simply reduced to a form of reciprocity? It’s adaptive to do favors for non-kin, iff they’re likely to do favors for you?
There’s a bit of bootstrapping problem there, but it doesn’t seem insurmountable.
I want to keep in mind that all of this is subject to scapegoating dynamics, where some group A coordinates to keep another group B down, because A and B can be clearly differentiated and therefore members of A don’t have to fear the bullying of other members of A.
This seems like it has actually happened, a bunch, in history. Whites and Blacks in American history is a particularly awful example that comes to mind.
Perhaps even simpler: it is adaptive to have a sense of fairness because you don’t want to be the jerk. ’cuz then everyone will dislike you, oppose you, and not aid you.
The biggest, meanest, monkey doesn’t stay on top for very long, but a big, largely fair, monkey, does?
It’s not difficult to see why groups would mutually believe in fairness: the alternative is fighting over resources, and fighting over resources destroys resources and kills people. But “being a jerk” is only instrumental … groups enforce norms of fairness and rule following by giving negative feedback to those who don’t follow them.
Not wanting to be a jerk is individually adaptive, but it’s more important to have an idea established system for avoiding conflict and allocating resources is adaptive at the group level.
Who gets how much of the pie is two different questions depending on how much pies are in short supply. If no one is starving, it might as well go to the hungriest person. If everyone is starving, it would be mutually agreeable to divide it equally...that way, no one is the loser .
You can fight over resources, or you do one of about three things to avoid a fight
Appeal to unwritten , traditional rules, ie ethics
Appeal to written rules, ie law
Appeal to the system that assigns winners and losers , ie. politics.
I want to consider this question carefully.
My first answer is that arguing about morality is a political maneuver that is more likely to work for getting what you want than simply declaring your desires.
But that begs the question, why is it more likely to work? Why are other people, or non-sociopaths, swayed by moral arguments?
It seems like they, or their genes, must get something out of being swayed by moral arguments.
You might think that it is better coordination or something. But I don’t think that adds up. If everyone makes moral arguments insincerely, then the moral argument don’t actually add more coordination.
But remember that morality is enforced...?
Ok. Maybe the deal is that humans are loss averse. And they can project, in any given conflict, being in the weaker party’s shoes, and generalize the situation to other situations that they might be in. And so, any given onlooker would prefer norms that don’t hurt the looser too badly? And so, they would opt into a timeless contract where they would uphold a standard of “fairness”?
But also the contract is enforced.
I think this can maybe be said more simply? People have a sense rage at someone taking advantage of someone else iff they can project that they could be in the loser’s position?
And this makes sense if the “taking advantage” is likely to generalize. If the jerk is pretty likely to take advantage of you, then it might be adaptive to oppose the jerk in general?
For one thing, if you oppose the jerk when he bullies someone else, then that someone else is more likely to oppose him when he is bullying you.
Or maybe this can be even more simply reduced to a form of reciprocity? It’s adaptive to do favors for non-kin, iff they’re likely to do favors for you?
There’s a bit of bootstrapping problem there, but it doesn’t seem insurmountable.
I want to keep in mind that all of this is subject to scapegoating dynamics, where some group A coordinates to keep another group B down, because A and B can be clearly differentiated and therefore members of A don’t have to fear the bullying of other members of A.
This seems like it has actually happened, a bunch, in history. Whites and Blacks in American history is a particularly awful example that comes to mind.
Perhaps even simpler: it is adaptive to have a sense of fairness because you don’t want to be the jerk. ’cuz then everyone will dislike you, oppose you, and not aid you.
The biggest, meanest, monkey doesn’t stay on top for very long, but a big, largely fair, monkey, does?
It’s not difficult to see why groups would mutually believe in fairness: the alternative is fighting over resources, and fighting over resources destroys resources and kills people. But “being a jerk” is only instrumental … groups enforce norms of fairness and rule following by giving negative feedback to those who don’t follow them.
Not wanting to be a jerk is individually adaptive, but it’s more important to have an idea established system for avoiding conflict and allocating resources is adaptive at the group level.
Who gets how much of the pie is two different questions depending on how much pies are in short supply. If no one is starving, it might as well go to the hungriest person. If everyone is starving, it would be mutually agreeable to divide it equally...that way, no one is the loser .
You can fight over resources, or you do one of about three things to avoid a fight
Appeal to unwritten , traditional rules, ie ethics
Appeal to written rules, ie law
Appeal to the system that assigns winners and losers , ie. politics.