It would be funny if the taxonomy of good arguments ended up quite similar to the taxonomy of logical fallacies. I mean, what is a typical “logical fallacy”? A weak evidence… in favor of a conclusion I disagree with.
For example, if scientists believe X, but Y is popular among crackpots, this seems like a good argument in favor of X… unless you happen to be a fan of Y, in which case it become a logical fallacy of argumenting by authority.
These seem to be also arguments that don’t fit this schema, for example, explaining in detail how stuff works. Problem is, these can also be constructed out of thin air, for example many pseudoscientists are able to provide models in favor of their theories that explain the effects using various “energies” and “vibrations” and whatever.
Interesting. It’s not clear that conspiracy theorists would disagree with scientists about the quality of an argument that touches on neither of their domains. It’s entirely possible that both are able to agree about good and bad arguments for (say) abortion rights, even if they have opposing positions. (E.g., they may well be able to agree that “X is a better argument than Y”, even when one disagrees with both, and the other agrees with both.)
It would be funny if the taxonomy of good arguments ended up quite similar to the taxonomy of logical fallacies. I mean, what is a typical “logical fallacy”? A weak evidence… in favor of a conclusion I disagree with.
For example, if scientists believe X, but Y is popular among crackpots, this seems like a good argument in favor of X… unless you happen to be a fan of Y, in which case it become a logical fallacy of argumenting by authority.
These seem to be also arguments that don’t fit this schema, for example, explaining in detail how stuff works. Problem is, these can also be constructed out of thin air, for example many pseudoscientists are able to provide models in favor of their theories that explain the effects using various “energies” and “vibrations” and whatever.
Interesting. It’s not clear that conspiracy theorists would disagree with scientists about the quality of an argument that touches on neither of their domains. It’s entirely possible that both are able to agree about good and bad arguments for (say) abortion rights, even if they have opposing positions. (E.g., they may well be able to agree that “X is a better argument than Y”, even when one disagrees with both, and the other agrees with both.)